Subject: MCB:P 251159Z JUN 07 CG 2ND MAW ALD(uc)

RE-ADDRESSAL V-22 MAINTENANCE MEETING DISCUSSION UNCLAS VMMT 204(uc)

P 251159Z JUN 07 RE-ADDRESSAL V-22 MAINTENANCE MEETING DISCUSSION   CG 2ND MAW ALD(uc)

TO 

COMNAVAIRFOR SAN DIEGO CA
CC  COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD(UC)
COMMARFORCOM ALD(uc)
   
    NAVAIRDEPOT CHERRY PT NC(UC)
    VMMT 204(uc)
    VMM 266(uc)
    VMM 263(uc)
    VMM 162(uc)
    MALS 26(uc)
    MAG 26(uc)
    CG 2ND MAW ALD(uc)
    CG 2ND MAW(uc)

UNCLAS
SUBJ:RE-ADDRESSAL

V-22 MAINTENANCE MEETING DISCUSSION POC/JOHNSON,
D.J./LTCOL/2ND MAW ALD/DSN:582-3201/

HAROLD.D.JOHNSON1 AT USMC.MIL//RMKS/1. 

CONCUR WITH THE MAG-26 CO AND THE URGENCY TO RESOLVE THESE ISSUES
IOT MITIGATE THE DEPLOYMENT RISKS.

UNCLAS
R 210939Z JUN 07 V-22 MAINTENANCE MEETING/DISCUSSION   MALS 26(uc)
TO  CG 2ND MAW ALD(uc)
CC  COMNAVAIRFOR SAN DIEGO CA
    COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD(UC)
    NAVAIRDEPOT CHERRY PT NC(UC)
    COMMARFORCOM ALD(uc)
    MAG 26(uc)
    MALS 26(uc)
    VMM 162(uc)
    VMM 263(uc)
    VMM 266(uc)
    VMMT 204(uc)

UNCLAS
SIC: //N04790//
SUB:V-22 MAINTENANCE MEETING/DISCUSSION
REF/A/LTR/MAG 26/5APR07//
AMPN/REF A IS EMAIL FROM MAG-26 CO TO MALS-26 CO DIRECTING A V-22 MAG
MAINTENANCE ISSUE MEETING/DISCUSSION.// RMKS/1.  PER REF A, A V-22
MAINTENANCE ISSUE MEETING/DISCUSSION WAS HOSTED BY MALS-26 ON 27 APRIL 2007.
ATTENDEES INCLUDED THE MAG/MALS/VMM COMMANDERS, AS WELL AS THEIR MAINTENANCE
OFFICERS.
OTHER ATTENDEES INCLUDED THE 2ND MAW AMO AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE FST
AND BELL BOEING.  THE PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING/DISCUSSION WAS TO PRESENT FOR ROSS-TALK, A CONSOLIDATED LIST OF HIGH PROFILE MAINTENANCE ISSUES, PRESENT

THE CURRENT OR FLEET PERCEIVED STATUS OF THESE ISSUES, COMPARE PRACTICES OR
PERCEPTIONS THAT MAY EXIST ACROSS THE MAG, AND FINALLY ASSESS THESE ISSUES
IN REGARD TO THEIR IMPACT ON OPERATIONS WHILE IDENTIFYING ISSUES THAT MAY
NOT CURRENTLY HAVE ADEQUATE SOLUTIONS. 

 INCREASED UTILIZATION OF AIRCRAFT
WILL DRIVE THE REQUIREMENT FOR A MUCH MORE INTENSE LEVEL OF EFFORT TO MEET PERATIONAL TEMPOS.  FOCUS MUST BE MAINTAINED TO ENSURE AN INCREASED LEVEL F EFFORT IS IN PLACE AND SUSTAINED TO ADDRESS THE IDENTIFIED ISSUES FACING THE MV-22.

2.  THE FOLLOWING ARE ITEMS OF CONCERN, IN ORDER OF PRIORITY:

A.  ICE PROTECTION SYSTEM:
  1.  CURRENTLY FACING NUMEROUS PROBLEMS/DISCREPANCIES WITH THE ICE
PROTECTION SYSTEM.  ISSUE IS BLOCK B SPECIFIC, FLIGHT CLEARANCE RELEASED
LATE MARCH.  SINCE THE RELEASE OF THE FLIGHT CLEARANCE THAT APPROVED IPS SYSTEM USE, VMM FMC RATES HAVE BEEN DRAMATICALLY IMPACTED DUE TO THE FRAGILITY OF THE SYSTEM. SOME PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED ARE WIRING RELATED (BENT PINS AND CHAFFING) ALONG WITH THE CENTRAL DEICE DISTRIBUTOR AND THE BLADE  DEICE DISTRIBUTOR.

THE CDD AFFECTS EVERYTHING ON THE HEAD (DEICING, LIGHTS AND BLADE FOLD).
CDD ISSUES STEM FROM WATER INTRUSION, HARDWARE MOUNTS WEARING OUT, AND  WIRING ISSUES.  BDD ISSUES INCLUDE FAILURE OF INTERNAL COMPONENTS/CONNECTORS AND CHASSIS.

ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT ISSUE IS BLADE HEATING ELEMENT FAILURES,
CAUSING ARCING, WHICH RESULTS IN BLADE DAMAGE. 

CURRENT PROBLEMS ARE DIFFICULT TO TROUBLESHOOT /IDENTIFY,

MANY TIMES LEADING TO SHOT-GUNNING PARTS, ALL WITH LONG LEAD TIMES. 

THE SYSTEM IMPACTS THE TRANSFORMATIONAL USE OF THE AIRCRAFT ANYTIME/ANYWHERE. 

TO DATE THE SYSTEM HAS IMPACTED 46 A/C, ACCOUNTED FOR 17,589 TOTAL SCIR HOURS, 5,949 HOURS OF NMC AND 11,640 PMC HOURS, WITH 26 CANNIBILIZATION ACTIONS.

  2.  IETMS CHANGES TO ASSIST IN TROUBLESHOOTING AND THE ABILITY TO
SUCCESSFULLY TROUBLESHOOT THE SYSTEM IS SLOWLY COMING ON LINE.
SOFTWARE CHANGES (JA2) ADVERTISED TO IMPROVE SYSTEM AND TROUBLESHOOTING. TARS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED, FST AND BOEING INVOLVED TRY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS.  CURRENTLY THERE IS A LONG PROCUREMENT LEAD TIME FOR REPLACEMENT PARTS.

B.  FCS/FLIGHT CONTROL COMPUTER/SWASHPLATE ACTUATORS:
  1.  CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE FCF PF BIT FAILURE AND SWASHPLATE
  FAULTS.  FCC POSTING FAILED, PF BIT ABORTS, SUSPECT MOST OF THE PROBLEMS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH ELECTRICAL FAULTS; SWASHPLATE ACTUATOR, PROBLEMS CAUSED BY GLAND SEAL LEAKAGE, ROD END BEARING WEAR, AND MOISTURE INTRUSION. 

FCC*S, DURING 2006 HAD 33 RETURNS:  VERIFIED
5 RELAY FAILURES, 6 RPM SENSOR FAILURES.  TO DATE THE SYSTEM HAS IMPACTED
132 A/C, ACCOUNTED FOR 31,627 TOTAL SCIR HOURS, 24,427 HOURS OF NMC 7,200
PMC HOURS, WITH 32 CANNIBILIZATION ACTIONS.

  2.  HAVING DIFFICULTY IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS/ISOLATING FAULTS (FST
ASSISTING).  DATA BUS ANALYZER IS BEING UTILIZED, HOWEVER STILL EXPERIENCING
REPEAT GRIPES. 

A BY PRODUCT OF THIS SITUATION IS LACK OF CONFIDENCE AND ADDED FRUSTRATION DUE TO THE HISTORY OF REPEAT GRIPES.

C.  ECS - AIR CYCLE MACHINE
  1.  AIR CYCLE MACHINES ARE EXPERIENCING HIGH FAILURES RATE DUE TO DEBRIS AND DIRT INGESTION CONTRIBUTING TO PREMATURE FAILURE OF BEARINGS. 

 MULTIPLE ENGINEERING INVESTIGATIONS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED.
MANUFACTURING LEAD TIME IS CURRENTLY 8-9 MONTHS, AND THERE ARE 22 IN REPAIR  CYCLE AT BOEING.  CURRENT SUPPLY SUPPORT STATUS IS, THERE ARE NO OUTSTANDING DOCUMENTS AND MALS-26 SUPPLY OFFICER HAS TWO RFI ON THE SHELF. 

TO PREVENT FUTURE FAILURES IT IS PROPOSED TO INSTALL A NEW, IMPROVED FILTER.  BELL BOEING WILL BE INTRODUCING A SDC INLET BARRIER FILTER VIA ECP 722, DURING SEPT 08.  LONG TERM FIX IS A PROPOSED BELL BOEING REDESIGN OF THE PITOT TUBE FILTER, NEW THRUST BEARINGS, UPGRADED JOURNAL BEARINGS AND SEAL CHANGE.

  2.  THE AIR CYCLE MACHINE IS A PMC GRIPE.  HOWEVER, IT WILL NEGATIVELY
IMPACT ABILITY TO FLY IN HOT CLIMATES, AND MAY NEGATIVELY IMPACT AVIONICS
SYSTEM COOLING CREATING FURTHER READINESS DEGRADATION. 

THE UNDERSTOOD CURRENT PLAN, FOR THE PROGAM, IS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SPARES TO MITIGATE THE POSSIBILTY OF HAVING LONG TERM DOWN A/C. 

 IF SPARE SUPPORT IS AVAILABLE IN ADEQUATE QUANTITIES, THIS SHOULD NOT BE A LONG TERM MAJOR IMPACTOR. +++++++++HOWEVER, IT WILL CONTINUE TO IMPACT A/C READINESS AND AVAILABILITY, WITH REGARDS TO DOWN TIME FOR REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF THE COMPONENT.

IF NOT PROPERLY MANAGED, THIS COULD VERY WELL BE THE ITEM THAT HAS THE GREATEST POTENTIAL TO ADVERSELY AFFECT OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES WHILE DEPLOYED FORWARD.  TO DATE THE SYSTEM HAS IMPACTED 61 A/C, ACCOUNTED FOR 4,161 TOTAL SCIR HOURS, 2,978 HOURS OF NMC AND 1,183 PMC HOURS, WITH ZERO CANNIBILIZATION ACTIONS.

D.  INFRARED (IR) SUPPRESSOR PANELS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE:
  1.  IR SUPPRESSOR RELIABILITY ISSUES ARE A DRIVING CONSIDERATION IN
AIRCRAFT READINESS.  PANEL FAILURE AND COANDA/DEFLECTOR TUBE FAILURES ARE FREQUENT LONG TERM DOWNING DISCREPANCIES. 

DAMAGED TUBES LEFT INSTALLED CREATE A PARTIAL MISSION CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, WHEREAS REMOVING THE TUBE IS A DOWNING DISCREPANCY. 

CURRENTLY, FRC EAST IS ATTEMPTING TO REPAIR SEVERAL OF THE LESS

DAMAGED TUBES THEREBY CREATING A POOL OF RFI TUBES. 

TO DATE THE SYSTEM HAS IMPACTED 157 A/C, ACCOUNTED FOR 57,089 SCIR HOURS, 53,688 HOURS OF NMC AND 3,401 PMC HOURS, WITH 24 CANNIBILIZATION ACTIONS.
 

2.  IRS PANEL MODIFICATIONS ARE FORTHCOMING WITH TWO RETROFIT KITS PER
MONTH SCHEDULED STARTING IN JULY 2007. 

IRS PANELS ARE EXPERIENCING 14 DIFFERENT DISCREPANCIES, OF WHICH SIX WILL BE ADDRESSED OR MITIGATED BY THIS MODIFICATION. 

IN THE MEANTIME, SQUADRONS HAVE RECENTLY USED DEPOT LEVEL
ARTISANS THROUGH THE P&E PROCESS TO DEVELOP LIMITED REPAIR CAPABILITY. 

P&E REPAIR PROCESS TAKES BETWEEN SEVEN AND FOURTEEN DAYS. 

DESIRED IMMEDIATE REMEDIES INCLUDE CREATING IRS PANEL REPAIR KITS

CONTAINING ALL REQUIRED FASTENERS AS WELL AS DEPOT PRODUCED STIFFENERS, CREATING AND MAINTAINING A SUPPLY OF SPARE IRS PANELS AND OBTAINING A SUPPLY OF SPARE COANDA/DEFLECTOR TUBES.

E.  PITCH CONTROL LINK (PCL) BEARINGS:
  1.  MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES OF ROD END BEARING IS  APPROXIMATELY
300 TO 500 FLIGHT HOURS. 

 REPAIR PROCEDURES ARE IN PLACE AT MALS-26, SUPPLY LOCATED A LIMITED QUANTITY OF BEARINGS TO REPAIR PCL*S UNDERGOING REPAIR,

CURRENTLY ZERO ON-HAND IN THE SYSTEM.

ADDITIONALLY, RECEIVED LIMITED NUMBER OF ROD END ASSEMBLIES (P/N
901-011-441-101 AND 901-011-441-103) FROM THE SYSTEM, WHICH RESULTED IN THE
REPAIR OF ALL BUT TWO PCLS, OF WHICH (01) WAS OUT FOR A NUT THAT HAS SINCE
BEEN REPAIRED ALSO.  (71) PCL*S AND (65) ROD ENDS HAVE BEEN REPAIRED SINCE
GAINING CAPABILITY ON 05 APRIL 07. 

LIMITED SUPPLY OF BEARINGS AND/OR ROD ENDS NEGATIVELY IMPACT
REPAIRS.  TO DATE PCL ISSUES HAVE IMPACTED 78 A/C AND ACCOUNTED FOR 15,582 TOTAL NMC SCIR HOURS, WITH 24 CANNIBILIZATION ACTIONS.
 

2.  SHORT RANGE MITIGATION EFFORTS INCLUDE ERAC 401 WHICH
  REQUIRES A 35 HR INSPECTION TO DETECT WORN PCL*S.  LIMITS ARE
.009 INCH WEAR, WHICH EQUATES TO 75% OF THE ORIGINAL BEARING LINER THICKNESS OF THE OUTER RACE. 

IT WAS RECOMMENDED BY FST TO START FORCED REMOVAL AT
EVERY PHASE.  CURRENT SUPPLY POSTURE CANNOT SUPPORT FST RECOMMENDATION, IT WOULD ALSO ADD IN EXCESS OF TWO DAYS TO EVERY PHASE. 

THE ONLY OPTION IS THE REPAIR OF PCL ON CONDITION, BY REMOVING AND REPLACING THE BEARING OR ROD END ASSEMBLES.

LONG TERM FIX WILL BE POSSIBLE REDESIGN OF ROD END AND/OR
REDESIGN OF THE BEARING. 

NO WORK AROUND EXIST, DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE
COMPONENT ONCE OUT OF LIMITS THE A/C IS NOT MISSION CAPABLE UNTIL THE PCL IS REPAIRED/REPLACED.  THIS CREATES A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON A/C READINESS DUE TO THE PREMATURE FAILURE OF THE BEARINGS WHICH IS COMPOUNDED BY THE DEGRADED SUPPLY POSTURE.

F.  ENGINE AIR PARTICLE SEPARATOR (EAPS) INSPECTION AND ASSOCIATED QUICK
DISCONNECT:

  1.  VIBRATION-INDUCED MATERIAL FAILURE OF HARD LINES. RESULTED IN THE
TEMPORARY RESTRICTION TO EAPS OPERATION.  WHICH FLEET WIDE VIBRATION
ANALYSIS OF ALL EAPS PERMITTED ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCEPTABLE AND NOT
ACCEPTABLE EAPS BLOWER MOTOR VIBRATION.

POSSIBLE EAPS UPGRADE AT LEAST ONE YEAR AWAY.  ANOTHER ISSUE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SITUATION, IS THE SEPARATION OR BACKING OFF OF THE EAPS HYDRAULIC LINE QUICK DISCONNECT (QD) FITTING. 

TO DATE THE SYSTEM HAS IMPACTED 16 A/C AND ACCOUNTED FOR 2,072 TOTAL PMC SCIR HOURS, WITH ZERO CANNIBILIZATION ACTIONS. CURRENTLY
01 A/C IS DOWN, OUT OF REPORTING, AS A RESULT OF AN EAPS FIRE FROM A QD
PROBLEM.

  2.  AN AFB IS CURRENTLY IN PROCESS TO CLEAN EAPS CASE DRAIN QUICK
DISCONNECTS AND PROVIDE PROPER RE-INSTALLATION PROCEDURES.
LIKEWISE, AN ERAC WILL FOLLOW INCORPORATING PROPER INSTALLATION PROCEDURES  INTO THE IETM. 

QUICK DISCONNECT PROBLEM WILL NOT BE TOTALLY ELIMINATED WITH
CURRENT HARDWARE IN USE.  REQUEST THAT A REDESIGN OR BETTER, MORE RELIABLE HARDWARE APPLICATION BE CONSIDERED.

3.  ADDITIONAL ITEMS DISCUSSED ARE AS FOLLOWS, ALTHOUGH THESE ITEMS ARE
STILL OF CONCERN THEY HAVE ADEQUATE SOLUTIONS TO MITIGATE THE IMPACT ON
READINESS, WITH FINAL FIXES IDENTIFIED AND FORTH COMING:

A.  NOSE LANDING GEAR
  1.  VMMT-204 EXPERIENCED SEVEN NOSE LANDING GEAR FAILURES FROM AUGUST 2000 TO AUG 2005, THREE FAILURES JUNE, AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER OF 2006 AND ONE IN JUNE 2007.  VMM-162 EXPERIENCED THE SAME FAILURE FEBRUARY OF 2007.

FOLLOW-UP INSPECTION OF ALL AIRCRAFT REVEALED, FIVE OUT OF SEVEN AIRCRAFT WERE OUT OF PROPER RIG.  CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE DEFORMED TORQUE TUBES FROM OVER-TORQUED SELF-LOCKING NUTS ON THE END FITTINGS. 

BINDING IN MOVEMENT OF THE TORQUE TUBE AT THE TORQUE TUBE END FITTINGS DUE TO DEBRIS IN THE END FITTINGS AND/OR DEFORMATION OF THE TORQUE TUBES, AND SPRING STRUT NOT RETURNING THE CENTER BELLCRANK ASSEMBLY TO AN *OVER CENTER* POSITION.

ALL PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED CONTRIBUTORS WERE CAUSAL FACTORS IN MISALIGNMENT OF THE BELLCRANK ROLLER WITH THE UPPER TORQUE LINK BRACKET (C-CHANNEL).

THIS MISALIGNMENT PREVENTS PROPER RETRACTION OF THE NLG DOORS CAUSING THEM TO BECOME *STUCK* ONCE IN THE CLOSED POSITION.  TO DATE THE SYSTEM HAS IMPACTED 32 A/C, ACCOUNTED FOR 7,591 TOTAL SCIR HOURS, 7,503 HOURS OF NMC AND 88 PMC HOURS, WITH 01 CANNIBILIZATION ACTION.

2.  NEAR TERM FIX WAS AN IMPROVED ALIGNMENT PROCEDURE, AS WELL AS REPLACING THE CLAMP BUSHINGS AND INSTALLING A NEW BELL CRANK STOP.
VMM-162 COMPLETED THE VAL/VER AND THE FINAL TD HAS RELEASED. KITS HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED AS WELL AS FOUR TOOL SETS.

THIS PROBLEM REPRESENTS A SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE WHICH PREVENTS THE EXTENSION OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR. EXPEDITIOUS INCORPORATION OF THIS TD IS CRITICAL. 

HOWEVER, THERE IS STILL CONCERN THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS CHANGE MAY INTRODUCE DIFFERENT PROBLEMS.  ALTHOUGH CONTINUED TRAINING AND INSPECTION MAY MITIGATE THIS PROBLEM, ECP 702,

THE NOSE LANDING GEAR REDESIGN, NEEDS TO BE A HIGH PRIORITY.

B.   FUEL SYSTEM
  1.  BLOCK-B A/C CONTINUE TO EXHIBIT FUELSYSTEM LEAKS DUE TO RUPTURE DISCS AND FUEL CELL VALVES.  FAILUREMODES ASSOCIATED WITH SAID ITEMS DOWN A/C SOMETIME IN EXCESS OFTHREE DAYS. 

THE BIGGEST DEGRADER IS THE VENT MANIFOLDS,SPECIFICALLY THE BLOWING OF RUPTURE DISKS. THE ORIGINAL DISCREPANCY, RUPTURING OF THE DISC, IS OFTEN MASKED BY THE FACT THERE'S NONE IN SUPPLY AND/OR IT'S EASIER
(QUICKER) TO SIMPLY REPLACE THE NHA (VENT MANIFOLD), WHICH HAVE BEEN MORE PLENTIFUL THAN THE DISC ITSELF.  AS IS THE CASE OFTEN TIMES WHEN IT COMES TO FUEL CELL DISCREPANCIES THERE IS THE REQUIREMENT TO PURGE AND GAS FREE CERTIFY, WHICH IS AN ENTIRE SHIFT OF NMCM EVEN IF YOU HAVE THE PARTS. 

TO DATE THE SYSTEM HAS IMPACTED 19 A/C, ACCOUNTED FOR 2,763 TOTAL NMC SCIR HOURS, WITH 02 CANNIBILIZATION ACTIONS.

  2.  THIS PROBLEM REPRESENTS A SAFETY ISSUE FROM INCREASED CHANCE OF FUEL LEAKS/SPILLS.  NEAR TERM FIX IS TO UTILIZE AN ADJUSTED FUEL LOAD , NOT FUELING A/C TO ADVERTISED CAPACITY.  A MOD TO THE FUEL SYSTEM IS CURRENTLY BEING INCORPORATED BY THE BOEING FIELD TEAM, NEW AND IMPROVED RUPTURE DISC AND SWEENEY FEED CELL CHECK VALVE. 

EXPEDITIOUS INCORPORATION OF THE MOD IS CRITICAL, ESPECIALLY AS WE GET CLOSER TO A POSSIBLE SHIPBOARD DEPLOYMENT FOR VMM-266, AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE PROBLEMS OF THIS NATURE ARE PARTICULARLY HAZARDOUS.

4.  USMC AIRCRAFT OPERATE IN HARSH ENVIRONMENTS WHICH CHALLENGE OUR MARINES* ABILITY TO MAINTAIN/REPAIR CRITICAL SYSTEMS AND PROVIDE FULL MISSION CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. IN THE CASE OF THE MV-22 THIS CHALLENGE IS EVEN MORE PREVALENT DUE TO SOME OF THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH NEW WEAPONS PLATFORMS. 

OVER THE PAST 9 MONTHS V-22 BLOCK A AIRCRAFT READINESS HAS BEEN AN AVERAGE OF 47.8% MISSION CAPABLE AND 34.9% FULL MISSION CAPABLE WHILE BLOCK B AIRCRAFT READINESS HAS BEEN ON AVERAGE 79.3% MISSION CAPABLE AND 62.1% FULL MISSION CAPABLE. 

BASED ON THE HISTORICAL DATA AVAILABLE, THERE IS A REASON FOR CONCERN WITH REGARD TO AIRCRAFT READINESS AND AVAILABILITY AS OUR BLOCK B AIRCRAFT BEGIN TO REACH THE FLIGHT HOUR THRESHOLDS WE HAVE ON OUR BLOCK A AIRCRAFT,

THRESHOLDS WE WILL REACH MORE QUICKLY WITH THE ADDITION OF SUSTAINED HIGH TEMPO OPERATIONS IN OIF.  WITH THIS IN MIND, AND WITH THE ADDED OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES THE OIF ENVIRONMENT WILL PRESENT, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT CURRENTLY KNOWN PROBLEMS/ISSUES ARE FULLY UNDERSTOOD, AND SOLUTIONS ARE AGGRESSIVELY PURSURED.  FAILURE TO BRING THESE ISSUES TO CLOSURE QUICKLY WILL RUN THE RISK OF SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACTING AIRCRAFT MATERIAL CONDITION, REDUCING READINESS, INCREASING SUPPLY COSTS, AND DEGRADING THE AIRCRAFT'S ABILITY TO SUPPORT THE FULL SCOPE OF OPERATIONAL MISSIONS AND TASKINGS ONCE IN THEATER.//

______________________________________________

And remember this is not a "new" aircraft overcoming growing pains. It first flew in 1989, they've spent $20 billion "fixing" this flawed design over these past 18 years.

                                                             Carlton Meyer  editor@G2mil.com

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