|
|
|
Readers must familiarize themselves with these subtopics to understand the concepts discussed in this chapter. These articles are linked within this chapter, but it may be easier to read them in advance. EFOGM - video guided missiles Steel Canopy - protects against top-attack Munition Countermeasures - jammer vehicles Infrared Communications - avoids the problems of RF comm CL-130 Seaplanes - can land almost anywhere KCH-53 Super Cow - rapid refueling for ground forces Where are the Amphibians? - armies need amphibious vehicles Reserve Urban Infantry - US ARNG must change Rhinos - compact heavy armor Guard Battalions - special "rearguard" units are needed Battalion Scout Helicopters - an inexpensive idea to boost combat power Scout Trucks - civilian trucks are stealthy Helltanks - missile-firing light tanks ___________________________________________________________ The biggest change for armies since World War II is that all equipment is much bigger and far more capable. The total deployment weight of a US Army armored division is more than a World War II armored corps, and its direct firepower capability is greater as well. The drawback is the logistical demands are enormous, especially fuel requirements that have grown from around 50% of supplies to 70%. The other major change is the appearance of long-range precision guided munitions that can be fired by aircraft, helicopters, and artillery. Modern armies focus all their efforts at training and preparing for direct engagements common in World War II. They neglect to address these two major threats that have arisen these past three decades -- lethal long-range precision guided munitions and the fuel sustainment problem. Air Defense After most of the Iraqi army was demolished by airpower in 1991, most armies became serious about air defense. An army that expects to fight without air superiority should have one armored air defense vehicle in every tank and APC platoon. Even armies that expect to fight with air superiority need to improve their mobile air defense to deal with UAVs, small scout helicopters, and long-range indirect fire missiles like EFOGM. The US Army has little interest in short-range air defense. It refuses to procure mobile radar-guided guns, possibly because its last attempt, the DIVAD, was a disaster. The US Army's primary mobile air defense systems are a variant of Bradley APC called Linebacker that has a 25mm chain gun and a four-pack of Stinger missiles, and the HMMWV-mounted Avenger, with a .50 caliber gun and two four-packs of Stingers. These can be linked to a stationary trailer-mounted radar system called Sentinel, but only if a unit is stationary for several hours so air defense can be set up. This is unacceptable because a modern air defense system must have mobile radar to detect threats to moving combat units. Otherwise, UAVs can operate overhead and tiny scout helicopters from a distance that can direct artillery fire, or fire long-range missiles themselves. They will not be detected unless someone in the maneuver unit happens to be looking in their direction with high-powered binoculars. This is nearly impossible on the move, and even while halted, soldiers tend to focus on what is directly ahead.
UAVs
and tiny helicopters have a very small infrared signature, so Stingers will not
lock-on them at long range. The Bradley's 25mm and the Avengers .50 caliber (12.7
mm) guns have limited range and no air burst,/proximity fuzed ammunition. Without radar
warning, they will only know a unit is under attack after vehicles begin to
explode. That tells them to look around and try to determine what is
happening, and try to find a target to engage, that is within range. To
make matters worse, the
US Army recently slashed its limited number of mobile air defense vehicles because
most Generals think air defense is just aircraft defense. Given the
limitations of the Linebacker and Avenger to combat smaller air threats, these cuts seem justified.
Armored forces must take the air threat seriously. The best short-range air defense weapon is the Bofors LVKV90 with a 40mm automatic gun that can fire five rounds a second. (right) This is designed to fight aircraft, but also outranges and outguns every armored infantry vehicle and every attack helicopter gun in the world. United Defense (now BAE Systems) purchased Bofors, so there is no reason that American armored forces should be denied the best air defense weapon in the world. The US Army should stop wasting money on Bradley upgrades and start buying this superior 40mm multi-mission system. This weapon is an effective anti-tank weapon as well. Rapidly impacting 40mm rounds can damage a tank's optical sights, explode reactive armor, break tracks, or damage the main gun. The LVKV90 carries an impressive 232 rounds and Bofors already makes a wide variety of modern 40mm munitions, including airburst rounds with a proximity fuze. The US Army deployed Bofors M42 "Duster" 40mm air defense guns to Vietnam during that conflict. Although they were never used against aircraft, they were very effective against infantry. Bofors 40mm AAA guns have also proved lethal in urban operations because they can super-elevate to fire at the upper floors of buildings, while their 40mm round is the perfect size to fire at buildings. It is big enough to blast through walls without penetrating too deeply into a building or causing catastrophic damage, like tank rounds often do. A modern army must have several 40mm AAA weapons organic to all maneuver battalions for air defense, which includes the need to gun down UAVs and tiny scout helicopters the moment they appear, while skeet shooting slow but deadly EFOGMs and whatever sensor-guided munitions appear overhead looking for targets. One topic everyone ignores is defending against incoming sensor guided munitions. One simple step is to install a Steel Canopy on top of armored combat vehicles to help shield them. Several Munition Countermeasures vehicles must be organic to all armored battalions. Finally, an infrared communications system may be installed on armored vehicles to evade RF sensor guided munitions and to prevent targeting by distant RF directional finding equipment. These are important topics, yet there is little discussion or research. Everything is focused on making multi-million dollar vehicles more potent, but no effort is made to hide or protect them from sensor guided munitions. This is a critical need, lest powerful armored forces become ducks in a shooting gallery during a war with a modern army.
Decoys are more effective now that modern militaries use long-range high-tech sensors, especially at night. A group of inflatable decoy tanks can be hooked up to a small generator that provides electricity to heat up key areas of the decoy with wiring like that used in electric blankets. This will guarantee it looks like a tank to anyone with an infrared viewer, like EFOGM gunners. If precision-guided munitions prove too deadly for an armored force, it may pause and deploy decoys to encourage an enemy to use up expensive munitions destroying air bags. Decoys can be placed forward of real tanks in defensive positions so an attacking enemy wastes rounds engaging them. Imagine the panic among attacking enemy tankers as they shoot several rounds at a dummy tank and "miss" each time as the projectile passes through. Airmobile units may bring decoys to set up along roads to deter attacks. If enemy aircraft or helicopters are a threat, decoy tanks can be placed in open areas away from regular tanks so the enemy attacks them, rather than searching for and destroying real tanks. Decoys may also be placed as bait by anti-aircraft crews setting a trap. Even when "destroyed" many decoy tanks can be patched and put back into action. Army officers must understand the lethality and range of today's weapons make it essential to include deception in every battle plan. Armies have a limited number of expensive precision-guided munitions, so it is best to encourage an enemy to waste them on inflatable decoys. Fuel Sustainment Chapter 10 addresses the fuel challenge faced during expeditionary operations. A lack of fuel stalled many offensive operations during World War II, yet the US Army burned 12 times more fuel per soldier each day in Iraq than it did in France in 1944. The US Army in Iraq burned nine gallons of fuel per soldier per day in 2004, in a mostly static operational environment. Another problem is that truck fuel tankers are easy to identify and destroy by enemy guerillas, commandos, and aircraft. A primary focus in designing a future war machine should be finding ways to improve fuel efficiency. Moving fuel becomes complex because it takes fuel to move fuel, unless pipelines are used. Army trucks may burn more fuel hauling fuel hundreds of miles inland than they deliver. One solution is to include enemy fuel depots as objectives during offensives, with plans to tap civilian gas stations. Fuel truck drivers should be trained to test fuel and equipped with hand pumps to scavenge from destroyed vehicles. Another option is limiting the number of huge gas guzzling combat platforms. Chapter 12 discusses how eliminating gas hungry self-propelled howitzers will help open up the main supply routes to greatly improve the logistical support for maneuver brigades. Fuel Efficiency Reducing fuel demand is a key challenge for a modern military. Soldiers rarely think of fuel efficiency while driving because no one taught them that rapid acceleration, sitting idle for several minutes, or driving too slow wastes fuel. Training must emphasis the fuel problem for armies while sergeants and officers demand fuel efficient vehicle operation. A second area for improvement is developing more fuel efficient engines. This concerns few Generals, most of whom have little understanding of logistics. A May 2001 study by the Defense Science Board "More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden" noted that fuel makes up 70% of the cargo tonnage needed to position the US Army in battle. The study said that if M1A1 tanks were 50% more fuel efficient , the 1990 Persian Gulf War buildup could have been 20% faster and ground forces ready to fight one month sooner. They noted that fuel delivered by ocean tankers costs only around $1 a gallon at the port, but transporting it inland can drive the cost up to $50 a gallon. In Afghanistan, the cost of delivering a gallon of fuel ranged between $400-$800 a gallon. The gas turbine engine used by the M-1 Abrams tank burns three times more fuel per mile than a diesel equipped tank. This has major strategic implications, but the gas turbine is quieter and provides greater acceleration, so Army tankers are reluctant to change. After all, fuel needs are never a problem in a garrison environment. However, fuel is costly, so fuel efficiently also translates to money saved from peacetime training as well. Another drawback to gas turbine engines is they generate four times more heat, making them magnets for infrared seeking munitions. In recent years, hybrid diesel-electric engines have appeared in the civilian market. These have two separate power systems, so the vehicle runs on either. When a vehicle stops or is moving very slowly, the diesel engine shuts off automatically and the car is powered by a large battery. When the accelerator is pressed demanding a speed of more than 5 mph, the diesel engine comes on for power. When brakes are applied, that energy is used to recharge the battery. Hybrids are more complex and more expensive, but the fuel savings over years more than pays for this. This technology has been examined for military use, but has not been adopted due to complexity concerns. Nevertheless, the simple idea of a larger battery has much merit. This allows an armored vehicle to shut off its engine yet still operate its internal lights, computers, radios, and sensors for up to an hour. This save much fuel, and shutting down an engine allows it to lower its infrared signature. Shutting down engines when idle is something all drivers must be taught. Some Mercedes automobiles have a simple fuel saving device. If the automobile accelerates too quickly, or sits idle too long, an buzz tells the driver he is wasting fuel. This idea can be used for military vehicles. Fuel planners throughout history have underestimated fuel requirements by using the advertised range of the vehicles to be employed. However, that range is usually measured on a paved highway at the ideal cruising speed. Vehicles in combat move at varied speeds over rough terrain and sometimes sit idle with engines running, so they burn twice as much fuel. As a result, the fuel requirements of each vehicle should be listed as highway and "combat." Fuel Scavenging During the 1944 "Battle of the Bulge", American troops were surprised to find many German troops equipped with hoses and hand-cranked fuel pumps. After years of fighting, the Germans had learned that it was much easier to scavenge for fuel than hope it arrives from distant rear areas. This is true today, every fuel truck driver should be trained and equipped to test fuel, as a precaution against sabotage, and pump it into his tanker. As fuel truck drivers head to the rear to load up, they should stop at every destroyed vehicle, friendly or enemy, and scavenge for fuel. Many will surprise their units by returning with fuel less than an hour after they left for a two day journey to a rear fuel depot. It should be common after every battle for fuel truck drivers to scavenge the battlefield for fuel, like vultures picking over the dead. Whenever a unit decides to abandon a seriously damage vehicle, a fuel trucker driver should immediately suck its fuel out. Units need a marking system using spray paint to indicate to other truck drivers that a vehicle has been tapped. Fuel Trailers Offensives are often slowed to allow wheeled refuelers to catch up with tanks. In difficult terrain, wheeled trucks cannot follow tanks, so tanks must retreat to the nearest road for fuel. Aircraft have used "drop tanks" for years to extend range. A similar solution is for tracked armored vehicles to tow extra fuel in trailers for long-range operations. An internal handle can allow the crew to release the trailer at anytime. Perhaps the terrain has become too rough, a major fight has begun and maximum mobility is desired, or the trailer has caught fire from artillery. Follow-on logistics units can retrieve such trailers and haul them forward for reuse. In the case of APCs, the trailer must be released to fully lower the rear ramp.
Aerial Resupply One method to avoid the problems of road supply is using aircraft. This may be essential for tracked vehicles that have climbed through terrain where wheeled trucks cannot follow. In addition, an enemy may cut off a main supply route with a counterattack or by using commandos. Finally, heavy rains can make dirt roads unusable, which saved the Soviet Union from defeat during World War II. Aerial resupply is the answer, albeit an expensive method. Although helicopters can take-off and land vertically, similar-size fixed-wing aircraft can carry twice their payload at twice their speed four times further. Most of the world has rivers and oceans where CL-130 Seaplanes can land to provide supplies to forward forces. The new KC-130J can function as a fuel tanker as well as a transport. After landing at austere airfields or roadways, the KC-130J can refuel helicopters, vehicles, and fuel trucks at 600 gallons (2,270 liters) per minute. Additionally, the unique prop feathering capability while the engines are still running ("HOTEL Mode") offers safer and more hospitable conditions for ground refueling than in the past. The KC-130J has a 57,500 pound (8,455 gallon) fuel offload capacity using wing fuel and external tanks. The aircraft also has the capability to carry an additional 24,392 pounds (3,600 gallons) of fuel in a specially configured internal fuselage tank. This means that a single KC-130J can fully refuel 40 M-1 heavy tanks.
Heavy lift helicopters are another option, and some should be configured as tankers like a KCH-53 Super Cow. This option allows fuel to be moved from ships offshore directly to units on the frontlines, bypassing vulnerable and congested port areas and roadways. One reason Rommel was able to dash across Africa with his Afrika Corps during World War II was because fuel was flown directly to frontline units from Italy. Recall that allied armies ran out of fuel in late 1944 as they approached the German border. Fuel was trucked from distant Normandy since the Germans held on at French ports. Had the allies flown fuel directly across the English Channel to allied armor at the German border, that war may have ended much sooner. Keep in mind that modern aircraft can carry many times more fuel than the old transports from that war. Tracked Resupply Vehicles In 1948, famous British military historian B. H. Liddell Hart wrote about his post-war interviews with German Generals in a book "The German Generals Talk". In Chapter 8 he writes about the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union: "The Germans lost the chance of victory because they had based their mobility on wheels instead of on tracks. On these mud-roads the wheeled transport was bogged when the tanks could move on. Panzer forces with tracked transport might have overrun Russia's vital centres long before autumn, despite the bad roads. World War I had shown this need to anyone who used his eyes and his imagination." He later wrote that even though the German army was modern, "it had not yet caught up with ideas that were twenty years old." Apparently, the US Army will relearn lessons that are now 80 years old since it has few tracked resupply vehicles for its armored forces. This is very important for the M-1 tank, whose gas turbine engine burns three times more fuel per mile than traditional diesels, and only carries 40 rounds for its 120mm main gun. Tank commanders will not push forward if they are low on fuel, or have only ten rounds left.
If an army wants truly
mobile armored forces, it must add a tracked logistics company to each armored
battalion. This "Log" company can consist of 32 tracked vehicles:
ten fuel, eight ammo, four maintenance, two medical/rescue, two engineer, two water purification,
two water tankers, and two tank retrievers. The rescue variants will pull up to a
damaged vehicle in combat to extinguish fires and allow medics in fireproof suits
to save the wounded. During World War II, it was common for mechanics to repair tanks
while engagements continued, something the maintenance variants will allow. Armored tracked maintenance variants can pull
up to vehicles minutes after they are immobilized by breakdowns or enemy fire.
TLAV
has proposed such logistical variants for the M113. Whenever a battalion halts near a water source, the two water purification units start producing water to refill the two water tankers. It is important for these vehicles to be tracked because they must leave roads to reach water sources, which are often along muddy river banks. The water tankers will also be capable of firefighting to assist the maintenance and rescue vehicles. The US Army lost dozens of expensive tanks in Iraq after a minor RPG hit started a small fire in the engine compartment. Since no firefighting vehicles were nearby, the fire slowly spread until it engulfed and destroyed the entire tank. The tank retrievers can pull out stuck vehicles, or tow damaged or broke down vehicles until a column halts where they can be fixed, or at least tow them to a nearby road where follow-on units can find and fix them. The fuel tankers will scavenge for fuel at every opportunity. The ammo vehicles will be designed so that ammo can be rapidly passed to tankers while under artillery or sniper fire, probably using a conveyor belt system on a movable boom that carries ammo from inside the vehicle right up to a tanker's hatch. This log company is too small to resupply an entire battalion at once, but it can immediately support key elements near enemy forces. Tracked vehicles can then dash to the rear to load more supplies from forward depots or trucks they encounter. This is far better than requiring combat vehicles to withdraw to the nearest road in rough or muddy terrain. Each vehicle will have at least a two-man crew, both trained as drivers, to double utilization when required since one can sleep while the other drives. Tracked vehicle resupply can boost the combat power of armored units by providing them supplies and support to keep them in action. Combat Organization Douglas Macgregor's book "Breaking the Phalanx" was published in 1997 and presented a bold plan to reorganize the US Army's ten 15,000-man active-duty divisions into more mobile and flexible 5000-man "Groups." The Army's chief complaint was that decades of division tradition and esprit would be destroyed. However, modern divisions are much more powerful than World War II divisions, consume far more supplies, and even require more manpower despite labor saving devices like computers and forklifts. This is because new technology added over the years grew these divisions. Once Army divisions added all the support attachments they wanted for the 1991 invasion of Iraq, divisions crossed the line of departure with over 22,000 soldiers each.
Macgregor overlooked the need for Infantry Divisions made up of foot soldiers, what the US Army calls "Light Infantry." These soldiers are not needed to fight as a maneuver unit, but to guard ports, airfields, POWs, bridges, and headquarters. They may also serve as military police or provide a labor pool for engineer units. In an emergency, infantry divisions can be disbanded to provide personnel replacements for maneuver units. In some situations, they will provide infantry units to augment armored forces involved in nasty urban fighting. Overall, they will retain the "grunt" tradition of getting all unwanted missions. They will rarely participate in large peacetime maneuvers, but focus on the basic infantry skills needed for their supporting role. Without infantry divisions, many highly trained and expensively equipped maneuver battalions will find themselves assigned to perform these basic tasks. In 2005, the US Army adopted some of Macgregor's ideas with the formation of modular brigades. However, his idea of saving tremendous manpower and overhead by eliminating the division layer of command was rejected. In addition, the Army decided that rotating brigade deployments overseas was a good idea, but it needed 43 active and 34 reserve combat maneuver brigades to fulfill its desired numbers. As a result, it will reduce the number of maneuver battalions in each brigade to two. The following is a discussion of these brigades and how they should be organized for future mobile ground warfare and modified for the two major threats that have arisen over these past three decades -- lethal long-range precision guided munitions and the fuel sustainment problem. RSTA Squadron vs Scout Company The US Army will have a ~365-man Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) squadron as part of each brigade. An army must not confuse itself with strange acronyms and old terms. A better description for this unit is a Scout Battalion. However, this is a small battalion, so if the battalion staff were eliminated along with the unnecessary command layer called "troops," this unit can function as a ~250-man company commanded by a Major who works directly for the brigade G-2. The current RSTA concept of employment is a fantasy where reconnaissance is performed in large, loud military vehicles without detection by the enemy. They also plan to conduct suicidal armed reconnaissance with light armored vehicles. They would be better off using horses like the original concept for cavalry scouts. In contrast, this proposed scout company will have platoons for specific functions with unique equipment allowing stealthy operations. Proposed Scout Company (~250 soldiers) Helicopter platoon - 8 tiny two-man helos supported by HMMWV platforms Truck platoon - 8 amphib trucks and 8 civilian light trucks / each with two scouts Recon platoon - 8 four-man teams afoot Track platoon - 8 light armored tracked recon vehicles NBC platoon - mounted on HMMWVs or tracks Intel platoon - SIGINT and Co. HQs mounted on HMMWVs or tracks This Scout Company is very different from an RSTA squadron because it is designed to conduct stealthy reconnaissance. A Scout Helicopter platoon is vital, as well as a Scout Truck platoon. Maneuver battalions will have some of these assets as well, but the brigade can provide additional support. If enemy units encounter these scouts, they will be surprised. The scout helicopters are tiny and quiet, the light trucks blend in with civilian traffic and can operate on electric power at night, while the amazing Humdingas (below) look like civilian trucks on the road and boats in the water. The four-man foot recon teams have no vehicles, so often hitch rides with other platoons.
The amphibious truck idea may confuse readers. Major advances is amphibious trucks have been made in recent years, primarily with the British Gibbs Humdinga This sporty vehicle can travel like a light truck, but can also make 30 mph at sea. Their sports car version recently zoomed across the English Channel. These are much more expensive than light trucks, yet far less expensive than armored vehicles. While their amphibious capability may be rarely used, it will provide a critical capability at times. The Scout Company will burn one-fifth the fuel of a RSTA squadron and provide a superior capability. Scout helicopters can go anywhere while light trucks covertly watch the road network and tracked vehicles cover areas of rough terrain. A recon team may ride in the back of any truck or track to provide more firepower, or operate on foot to check areas that vehicles cannot reach. The scout helos will often drop off a team on a mountainside or near a vital road junction where they can radio intel reports. 20 x Armored Brigades This is the main fighting power for an army, based around heavy tanks. The US Army plans for 20 of these to be called "heavy" brigades, yet they include unneeded tank battalions. The need to concentrate that much pure tank firepower in one battalion is overkill. What is needed are tank-infantry "armored" brigades designed to assault prepared enemy positions and destroy them. The US Army plans for each brigade to have just two heavy maneuver battalions, each with two tank companies and two mechanized companies. A better idea is an armored brigade with three heavy "armored" battalions organized like this: Proposed Armored Battalion Headquarters Company Two Tank Companies - heavy tanks Mechanized Company - APCs with infantry Security Company - 4 x Helltanks, 4 x 40mm AAA, 4 x Air Defense (radar/laser/Stinger), 4 x scout helos Artillery Battery - 4 x 120mm mortars, 4 x EFOGM, 4 x "Ground Apache" launchers Logistics Company - 32 tracked support vehicles The big change is replacing one mechanized company with a security company and the addition of a logistics company. Overall manpower remains the same since a mechanized company is manpower intensive. The Bradley's anti-tank TOW firepower is replaced by longer-range Hellfires, EFOGM, and infrared-seeking 120mm mortar rounds. The Bradley only carries seven infantrymen each, so the net loss of rifle trigger pullers is minor. In highly mobile combat operations, infantrymen are just cargo. If an armored battalion is assigned to assault fortified positions or conduct urban operations, more infantry can be attached, as is already a requirement today. Heavy/Armored Brigade Comparisons
The Support Battalion proposed here will be smaller because each battalion has much more organic support in their tracked logistics company. In addition, eliminating the howitzers, as discussed in Chapter 12, reduces the support burden. The lighter systems in the proposed artillery battalion require less manpower and less fuel than the lumbering 155mm self-propelled howitzers and their ammo train. Today's modular brigades will typically have four Corps-level mobile anti-aircraft systems attached, and these have no organic radar and inadequate weaponry. This proposal adds 20 organic anti-aircraft systems. Recall the Hellfire and EFOGMs are also excellent anti-helicopter systems while the "Ground Apache" missile launchers described in Chapter 12 and the Countermeasures vehicles can fire Stingers. Four maneuver battalions per brigade are ideal and is desired by most Army officers, but this proposal for three is based upon the US Army's manpower limits for a desired number of brigades. One option is the establishment of a fourth "round out" battalion in the Army reserve that is based alongside the active-duty brigade, or within a couple hundred miles if demographics make that impossible. This battalion can recruit soldiers from the brigade who are leaving active-duty, and thus much more likely to join a unit they already know. Even with three battalions, this proposal requires over 500 more soldiers per brigade, or 10,000 more for 20 armored brigades. However, the infantry/airborne brigade proposal, to be discussed shortly, eliminates brigade overhead to shed 580 soldiers per brigade, or 8700 for 15 active-duty infantry/airborne brigades. This also sheds 19,720 positions from the 34 ARNG infantry brigades, which is helpful due to their current recruiting problems. In addition, eliminating that many reserve positions allows for a couple thousand fewer full-time personnel needed to support reservists. 8 x Cavalry Brigades The US Army plans for five active-duty "Stryker" brigades to fill the need for light armored brigades to act like cavalry. However, they chose a wheeled vehicle, which limits off-road mobility, and it is not even amphibious. The main armament for the infantry carrier is an awkward roof-mounted remote-controlled .50 caliber (12.7mm) machine gun. They have spent years trying to develop a light tank version with a 105mm gun, but they have encountered the expected problem of too much recoil for a light vehicle. Finally, these Strykers grew so much in weight that their primary means of deployment, the C-130 transport, can lift them just a couple hundred miles and only land on hard runways with that much weight. This family of vehicles with highly sloped armor and a 40mm automatic cannon (left) can eventually replace the Bradley, a good vehicle but taller with a fat Sherman tank profile and just a 25mm gun. CV 90s can later replace most of the M-113s, that may convert to tracked logistics vehicles. Eventually the CV 90s will replace the wheeled Strykers. As the Army replaces these three entirely separate types with the CV90 family of common chassis and engines, support costs will fall sharply while firepower increases dramatically. The US Army should adopt this vehicle for future cavalry brigades, although some minor modifications are required to add an amphibious capability, like propellers, bilge pumps, and steering vanes. The CV90 uses the same gun and ammunition as the Bofors radar-guided 40mm AAA version mentioned above. The cavalry brigades proposed here are identical to an armored brigade, except the two tank companies in each maneuver battalion consists of light Helltanks rather than heavy tanks, which have the same body and engine as the CV-90s. This brigade's three cavalry battalions are entirely tracked amphibious vehicles. Their main armament is provided by Helltanks and 40mm autocannons. (I realize that many in the US Army prefer to call cavalry units regiments with squadrons and troops. While nostalgic, this causes much confusion.) The employment of cavalry brigades is ideal after armored forces have broken through and the enemy is in disarray. Since they consume half the fuel of an armored brigade, they may be sent charging forth at top speed to a distant objective. While they lack the armor to assault prepared defenses, Helltanks in the defense can easily repel a heavy tank assault. As a result, cavalry brigades will often deploy along open flanks to fend off counter-offensives. A cavalry brigade's amphibious capability means they can drive off ships near shore and land anywhere. They can dash across rivers, lakes, marshes, and bays. In difficult terrain, they can use rivers as highways, or outflank an enemy by conducting a seaward envelopment. This amphibious capability will continually surprise enemy commanders who didn't think a unit could outflank him in that manner. The US Army has no such capability today. Defenses against the US Army's armored brigades can be concentrated around bridges and areas where terrain restricts tanks to roads. Read about amphibians to learn more. These 8 cavalry brigades will provide a new capability to support the Army's 20 heavy armored brigades. 41 x Infantry Brigades (7 active/ 34 reserve) The need for foot infantry is as great as ever, yet many strategists ignore this need completely. Most important battles will be fought in cities where armored forces perform well, but they can't enter certain areas. A modern enemy will have an excellent commando force, so all ports and vital facilities must be guarded by infantry. Guarding POWs and dealing with unruly civilians requires foot infantry. This is an excellent role for Reserve Urban Infantry. Foot infantry units require little equipment, so are ideal for reserve units since their primary cost is manpower. Five reserve light infantry brigades can be maintained for the cost of one active duty brigade. In contrast, equipment intensive units like armored brigades provide a cost savings of just two reserve units for each active duty unit. In the US Army's plan for a total force of 77 modular combat brigades, more than half should be infantry brigades. All Army National Guard (ARNG) brigades should be light infantry brigades, so only only 7 of these 41 brigades will be on active duty, the other 34 will be in the reserve force. This will greatly simplify training and equipment maintenance in the ARNG. There will be no reserve armored, cavalry, or airborne brigades that require expensive equipment, expensive maintenance, and continual training. However, a few ARNG brigades will be designated for specific infantry missions with some special equipment. For example, a Mountain brigade in Colorado and an Arctic brigade in Alaska. There may be a POW brigade trained in the complexities of caring for prisoners, and a couple of brigades that focus on Military Police training. The infantry brigades proposed here have three battalions designed to operate independently for varied security missions, or to reinforce armored brigades. It is better to think of these 41 infantry brigades as 123 reinforced light infantry battalions, because that is their concept of employment. The brigade headquarters is only a Colonel, his adjutant, a radio operator, and a driver. The Colonel acts a liaison to higher headquarters who allocates support to his three battalions from his Support Battalion. As a result, the "brigade headquarters" is just an office in its Support Battalion. Infantry Brigade Manpower Comparisons
Most army officers agree that an infantry brigade with four maneuver battalions is desired, but the US Army concluded that it can only field two given its manpower limits and a desire to have enough brigades to rotate a desired number overseas. Two fewer battalions also reduces the required number of artillery batteries and support soldiers. The lean brigade with maneuver three battalions proposed here has no brigade staff, RSTA, nor artillery. The overhead savings easily provides manpower for another infantry battalion. The requirements for the Support Battalion are much less since it has less equipment to help maintain. However, it does include a Rhino company and a AAA company, so its manpower requirement is around 800 soldiers. The proposed Support Battalion includes trucks and logistics soldiers, but also a Rhino company, and an AAA company with 40mm radar-guided autocannon vehicles. These companies are administratively part of the Support Battalion, yet elements are directly attached to infantry battalions for weeks at a time. In some cases, these units will be shifted among brigades to support varied missions. For example, an infantry battalion attached to an armored brigade to assault a city may want two Rhino companies, while a battalion guarding POWs needs no extra firepower, while those guarding airfields and headquarters will desire the anti-aircraft vehicles, whose 40mm autocannons are excellent anti-commando weapons as well. As a result, these independent infantry battalions will often command some 1000 soldiers because of long-term attachments from the brigade. The support battalion may spin off composite "FCS" companies to support distant infantry battalions directly. A brigade may have battalions performing duties hundreds of miles apart, or even in different nations. This is how US Marine Corps battalions are supported when they operate independently as a "MEU." Each MEU is supported by a 300-man MEU Service Support Group consisting of seven platoons.
What happens is that brigades are tasked with small missions to fill this need for foot infantrymen, while much of their equipment and brigade staff sit idle and all of their expensive pre-deployment brigade-level training is wasted. While 123 reinforced infantry battalions seems huge, this proposal calls for only 7 active duty infantry brigades, organized as 21 reinforced infantry battalions. With a three to one peacetime rotation, this provides only seven independent infantry battalions for overseas duties. These battalions are ideal for rapid airmobile deployment, and are likely to be the first deployed unless airborne battalions are required. Unless there is great confidence in a host nation to provide security against a competent enemy who is likely to dispatch commandos, a Corps headquarters will want an infantry battalion for security. Keep in mind that a battalion tasked to provide 24-hour security everyday will only have one of its four companies on guard duty at a given time. A battalion will also be required to protect each airbase where billions of dollars of aircraft are arriving. As the cargo arriving off ships fills up a massive area, that must be guarded. Meanwhile, arriving armored forces need a few weeks to organize and are vulnerable to attack, so a few infantry battalions are posted at forward cities where they can run checkpoints to deter commandos and put up a fight to delay an advancing enemy should he decide to attack armored brigades assembling in the port area. As the Corps plans its offensive, it decides that two large POW camps are needed, and an infantry battalion for each. Armored brigades assigned to capture major cities will insist that an infantry battalion be attached in case street fighting gets nasty or local civilians become unruly. Once all these needs are totaled, Generals will realize they need foot infantry from the ARNG brigades, so those are mobilized. As the US Army learned in Iraq, a conquering army is soon overwhelmed by the need for foot infantry. Independent light infantry battalions are ideal for this role, and dozens of other requirements. These battalions can also fill the overlooked need for instant replacements. During a serious war, manpower systems often fail to supply needed replacements on a timely basis and combat maneuver brigades become seriously undermanned and less effective. Therefore, it will be expected that some infantry brigades may be disbanded and their soldiers distributed. This foot infantry mission should not be confused with counterinsurgency operations. One of the wrong "lessons learned" from Iraq is that all infantry must be protected by armored vehicles. That is true to some extent for counterinsurgency operations in an occupied nation. However, counterinsurgencies do not mushroom overnight. Foot infantry is needed to keep looters and criminal activity in check, and to guard large numbers of POWs. It may be nice if all had heavy, expensive armored vehicles to use, but that adds a tremendous logistical burden and slows their movement into and within Theater. Armored units will be available if armor is needed, and if an invading force transitions to an long-term occupation force, infantry units can be equipped with armored vehicles as needed. This was required in Iraq, it was not required in Kosovo. 8 x Airborne Brigades These brigades will have the identical lean structure of infantry brigades. Each airborne brigade consists of two paratrooper and one guard battalion organized to fight as independent battalions. It is better to think of these 8 airborne brigades as 16 paratrooper battalions and 8 truck-mounted guard battalions, because that is their concept of employment. While they are similar to infantry battalions, their training is more complex as they must be parachute capable and familiar with airmobile and helicopter assault operations. Each paratroop battalion will have four companies of foot infantry also trained in mountain warfare. Guard battalions are mounted on light trucks to provide rearguard or extended flank security.
These battalions are sent into chaotic situations like the 101st Airborne was in 1944, to stall an enemy offensive. They do not expect firepower or logistical support; they are trained to improvise and operate as an independent battalion amid the chaos around them. They will not panic if supplies are not sent forward or communications are nonexistent. Granted, they will not last long without support, but they will last until the tide has turned. These battalions will mostly function as elite infantry battalions. However, Generals must be careful not to waste them on whatever battle is at hand. Every battle seems critical, and elite units have often been destroyed when frequently employed for basic infantry missions. An example was the elite 10th Mountain division that was sent to Italy in 1944. Generals were impressed by its accomplishments and began to throw it into every battle. Most missions were basic infantry assault missions, so after a few months, very few of the original specially trained 10th Mountaineers remained, and that special capability was lost. Airborne units are specially trained for special operations. They should not be assigned basic infantry missions if infantry battalions are available. Aviation Brigades Helicopters are great, but numbers and types depend on what an army can afford and the air defense threat they face. As discussed in Chapter 8, every armored and cavalry battalion should have tiny scout helicopters for direct support. These deploy with their battalions into the field. All other helicopters should be organized into aviation brigades to maximize training and maintenance. It is impractical to expect modern helicopters to advance alongside maneuver units. It is not just a matter of airfields, but their fuel, ammunition, and maintenance requirements are substantial. However, establishing forward arming and refueling points are essential, and the idea of keeping combat-ready helicopters "on station" by landing them in a secure forward area is a good idea for medivac and attack helicopters. Aviation brigades will exist at the Corps-level or higher and normally consist of the same type of helicopter. Specific aviation battalions may be attached to specific ground combat units for extended periods to increase coordination and responsiveness. Task organized composite aviation brigades may be created to support specific operations. These may exist for years, for example, a composite aviation brigade of all types may exist in Alaska. In some cases, composite aviation battalions may be formed to support smaller units in remote areas organized for the specific task assigned. The US Marine Corps routinely forms composite helicopter squadrons (e.g. battalions) to support ship deployed infantry battalions. Aviation brigades are a more flexible and economical concept than the awkward arrangement of aviation battalions organized within combat maneuver brigades that end up based far to the rear alongside aviation battalions from other ground combat brigades. Mobile Operations How will these four types of brigades fight?
Military theorist, the late Colonel John Boyd, postulated that the best Urban Warfare This is discussed in Chapter 14, but which of these brigades will be employed in the urban warfare environment. The answer is that all will be involved since most combat will be fought in urban areas. However, the exact urban environment and threat will vary widely. Fighting among skyscrapers is much different than fighting in one-story residential neighborhoods. While armored brigades are usually best, they may be reinforced with one or more independent infantry battalions and their Rhinos. It may be common to assign an entire infantry battalion a mission of clearing a single large building, a task that may take days, something the Israeli army learned in Beirut. Tanks provide excellent direct firepower in cities, and are vital since their armor is RPG proof. However, a tank's main gun cannot elevate very high, and tank rounds often cause excessive damage. In addition, they cannot fire their 120mm gun when friendly infantrymen are in front or even to the side as the gun blast will knock them unconscious. Finally, since they can only fire one round every few seconds, enemy infantrymen learn to dash around in between rounds. History has shown the best weapon for urban fighting is the 40mm autocannon, which can super-elevate and hose down an area without causing too much structural damage, and there is no pause to reload between firings. Rhinos will provide unique support for urban warfare, and every infantry squad will want its own. Cavalry units are of limited value in close-in fighting since light tanks cannot withstand RPGs. However, most people have never seen an amphibious armored vehicle, so the idea that a light armored force may cross a river in a city is not considered. A traditional enemy will focus defenses on bridges, low-water crossings, and open areas where helicopters might land. In such situations, a cavalry unit may swim across a river into an undefended area, then charge into an enemy's rear causing him to flee in panic. Even if enemy commanders are aware of this amphibious threat, they must weaken their defenses at key positions in order to deploy forces along miles of river just in case this tactic is used. Blitzkrieg Blitzkrieg remains the best term for rapidly advancing armored forces. The objective of an offensive will vary widely so specific operations are difficult to discuss. One major change since World War II has been the worldwide construction of paved roadways with first-class bridges. The mobility challenge is to advance rapidly on the road network across vital bridges, which a competent enemy will focus his defense, or at least destroy or damage them. Keep in mind that large, modern bridges are not easily destroyed since this requires a ton of explosives and several hours for dozens of skilled engineers to properly place charges. However, seemingly competent armies often fail at this task due the chaos involved in dealing with an enemy breakthrough. In addition, while engineers are trained to demolish bridges, it is a complex task that they never perform in peacetime, and rarely in wartime, so expertise is lacking. This is why dedicated Guard battalions are needed by all armies, while the manpower required to guard key bridges from a surprise enemy seizure is yet another reason for large numbers of foot infantry units.
Seizing bridges from the far side is always best. First, if an enemy has bridge readied for demolition, controls will be on the far side of the bridge. In addition, a surprise attack from the far side will catch enemy forces stuck on the opposite side and on the bridge itself. As a result, an enemy will be reluctant to blow up a bridge, even if ready for demolition as they do not want to kill their buddies. Finally, if the bridge is seized from the far side, it can trap enemy forces who have yet to cross. Don't forget that most rail lines and their bridges can serve as roadways too, at least for tracked vehicles. These can be used to envelop an enemy and clear out a road bridge. The next objective is to locate and capture enemy and civilian fuel sources. The German army lacked enough fuel for its ambitious 1944 Winter offensive that became known as "The Battle of the Bulge." They planned to use captured American fuel for most of their needs, and were successful to an extent, but not enough was seized. With a planet covered with automobiles and civilian gas stations, intelligence should be able to determine which are operating. These should be noted as objectives. However, a wise enemy will set them afire as armored forces approach, although armies in disarray will not bother. Soldiers in stealthy scout trucks may dash ahead and quietly secure them until armored forces arrive. This may mean watching them covertly and only shooting should someone attempt to harm the precious fuel. Airborne units may be dispatched to seize larger fuel storage facilities. Another objective is evaluating water needs. As a general rule, planning to haul water forward is a poor plan. Providing potable water locally can lessen overall supply requirements by 10%. The civilian population is probably drinking potable water. Is that operating? Where are good places to tap in? Do farmers use water wells that can be tapped? Where are good places for water purification units to set up? Ideally, these are with lead units and set up just after a good water point is encountered so they can provide water to passing vehicles. Food can be seized to support advancing forces, but given the local civilian population needs, most store shelves may be empty, and seizing scarce food will make soldiers uncomfortable and unpopular. Another objective to consider are locations where fixed-wing aircraft can land to drop off supplies and evacuate wounded and prisoners. While helicopters can move supplies by air, aircraft can carry much larger loads, much faster, and much further. In addition, establishing forward arming and refueling points for helicopters and propeller support aircraft as described in Chapter 11 is important. Finally, if an army is lucky to have support from CL-130 seaplanes, there are likely numerous waterways where these can land to support advancing forces. Mobility Training It is difficult to discuss future combat scenarios because they vary widely. There is no "Fulda Gap" example common during the Cold War where known units with known weaponry can be compared. In 1991, the US Army filled this void with heavy analysis of the "Battle of 73 Eastings," an unimportant engagement toward the end of the 1991 Gulf war when the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (a tank brigade) destroyed an Iraqi armored brigade in the open desert. Not much was learned, except that American tanks were far better than older Soviet equipment, and that software-generated scenarios are fun to play.
An ideal site for such training is Hawthorne Army Depot in western Nevada. This was on the Army's 2005 base closing list because it is no longer needed. However, it was removed from the list since monetary savings were minuscule due to the impact range cleanup costs. This base has 147,000 acres and 600,000 sq. ft. of floor space that include 178 buildings and 2,427 igloos, and a 49,000-acre live fire ordnance test facility where units can conduct live firing. This is already a massive ammunition storage depot, so that is no problem. Moreover, it is adjacent to the huge Nevada Test and Training range, which is five times larger than Fort Irwin. Since this is the US Air Force's premier training area, exercises can coincide as armored units trek though hundreds of miles of Nevada roads. This training will increase the mobility of armored forces. The faster combat units move, the more difficult they are to target with indirect precision-guided munitions. Rapid movement often panics an enemy as he is unable to make timely decisions. Theorists prefer neat computer models where units move on a game board and moves pondered based on a clear view of enemy units. They want wars with perfect clarity provided by sophisticated surveillance and reconnaissance systems. This idea is pushed by aircraft pilots accustomed to an air traffic control system that provides total clarity. Combat in a serious mobile war will consist of surprise encounters in which direct fire engagement the first few minutes will decide each battle. Greater mobility is best accomplished by greatly reducing logistical requirements with training, more fuel-efficient engines, using enemy fuel when possible, and planning to produce water. The problems of moving supplies over road networks can be reduced by using aircraft and helicopters. Logistical requirements can also be slashed by eliminating lumbering howitzers and their supply train that clog road networks, and using fixed-wing propeller observation aircraft to ensure that firepower is allocated effectively. Mobile air defense systems are needed for aerial defense to deal with UAVs, small helicopters, and loitering precision-guided munitions, while countermeasures and decoys also play a role. Finally, great attention must be focused on securing main supply routes, which means seizing bridges and key terrain before an enemy can destroy, mine, or fortify them. ©2006 www.G2mil.com |
One method of dealing with deadly sensor guided munitions is with decoys. These were used
extensively during World War II, and their value remerged after the 1999 air war against Yugoslavia when the US Air Force discovered that most of its
"successful" missions had only destroyed crude decoys. A Chinese
company 
The British developed a trailer for their
Centurion tanks. (left) The hot turbine engine used by the American
M-1 tanks poses a minor problem. However, "towing
shields" already exist for the M-1s. Fuel trailers allow tracked vehicles to
tow fuel over terrain where wheeled trucks cannot venture. In many
cases, tanks may tow the same fuel trailer for an entire campaign, having
it filled up whenever the tank refuels. If vehicles will make a long
road march, extra supplies can be strapped atop the fuel tanker. In armies
where trucks routinely tow trailers, it is amazing that powerful tracked armored
vehicles haven't their own.
While the US Marine Corps has some KC-130Js, the US Air Force has none to
support the US Army, except a few older and less capable HC-130s to support Army Special Forces. A "KCL-130J" seaplane could provide ground force
commanders with a tremendous capability to support mobile combat forces.
In addition, C-2 Greyhounds (right) allow fuel and supplies to be flown
directly from aircraft carriers to austere runways near mobile ground combat
units. Ship-to-vehicle airmobile refueling eliminates all the personnel and equipment involved in
off-loading fuel from tankers to bladders ashore, transporting the fuel by
truck, plus thousands of soldiers required to provide messing, security, housing
and other needs for the soldiers involved in moving fuel by truck. The US
Army should buy several dozen "KC-2s" for this mission, as well as other C-2 variants
as discussed in Chapter 11.
Two
M113 armored personnel carrier variants have been modified for logistical
support, the XM1108 (left) and the M548A3 (below), yet these are found in just a few support units.
Perhaps the larger Bradley with its powerful engine can also be modified to carry cargo. Some
may be fitted
with a removable tank, making it easy to shift from water to fuel to cargo depending
on the tactical situation. 
Macgregor's book provides details into the exact
organization of his "Groups," which are reinforced brigades capable of
independent operations. This is a great concept, but the simple
solution to overcome resistance to "Groups" is to call them
"Divisions." A second suggestion is to use traditional and
shorter designations for these divisions. Macgregor's "Heavy Combat
Group" is full of armored vehicles, so call it an "Armored
Division." The "Light Recon-Strike Group" should be called
a "Cavalry Division," and his "Airborne/Air Assault Group"
should be called an "Airborne Division" since soldiers in helicopters
are airborne too.
Some elements of the RSTA squadron make sense. The NBC
reconnaissance platoon is retained as well as the SIGINT elements. A
platoon of tracked light armored vehicles is used for missions that require
off-road reconnaissance in terrain where wheeled light trucks cannot operate. However, the idea that RSTA
is best accomplished by employing only wheeled light
armored vehicles is wrong. Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
is best accomplished by stealthy platforms, while armed reconnaissance is best
conducted by heavy tank units that find the enemy when he fires at them.
A far superior cavalry vehicle is the superb Swedish 
These
are light "foot" infantry battalions with little organic transport. They will rely on truck
transport from their support battalion, and have several scout
trucks for general use plus HMMWV variants for specific roles. They may
also be
transported by helicopters or APCs from other units. This is all
foot infantrymen normally require for diverse missions that are generally ignored by
peacetime armies. During wartime, combat brigades are deployed overseas with all the staff
and equipment to operate as a maneuver unit. However, Generals quickly
realize they need troops to guard airfields, ports, and massive equipment
caches, not just from commandos but from local thieves, and allied thieves.
Headquarters need security, and senior officers and VIPs need personal
security. 
These battalions are not designed to fight large battles. The brigade headquarters is just a command section
whose Colonel serves as liaison officer to higher headquarters, except
on rare occasions in which coordination is needed because more than one
battalion is assigned the same mission. These brigades are best described
as elite battalions of firemen that rush anywhere on short notice with
little logistical support. They may be landed to seize an objective for advancing forces
or to block the movement of enemy forces. They may sent to protect supply
lines that are harassed by bypassed enemy units, or to hunt down enemy
commandos. 
An
army must plan to seize bridges with
surprise. This can be done with paratrooper battalions or helicopter landed
troops, unless enemy air defenses are effective. During World War
II, German paratroop units landed directly atop of their
objective. American airborne units prefer to land a few miles away at
drop zones and then reassemble into units to attack. Another option
is the use of amphibious cavalry units to cross a river at an undefended area
several miles from the bridge and seize it from behind. There is also the night attack
option, by using the river cruise tactic. Amphibious vehicles can enter
the river several miles upstream at night, shut their engines off, and drift
with the current using their steering vanes. When they are near the rivers
bank, they can open fire on befuddled bridge guards while they start their
engines and rush ashore.
One thing the US Army has learned in both 1991 and 2003 is that it never trains
units to blitzkrieg. All "heavy" unit training is focused on engagements
in open terrain. This doesn't prepare units for charging hundreds of miles
along roads and dealing with the resulting logistical problems. The US
Army should develop a mobility training center where battalions or brigades are
expected to charge forth and cover a few hundred miles, mostly along roadways
filled with cars, while encountering hasty minefields, damaged bridges, and
towns with snipers. The unit will be expected to tap a couple civilian gas
stations along its route, deal with commandos who cut supply lines, make most of
its water, fix broke vehicles, scavenge for fuel, and deal with prisoners. It will
capture a small airfield where supplies are flown in and establish a forward
arming and refueling point for helicopters.