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The first aircraft to attack Baghdad during the
1991 Persian Gulf war were not F-117 stealth fighter-bombers, but old B-52s that launched cruise missiles hundreds of miles from Iraqi territory.
Later in that conflict, B-52s became a key weapon to pummel Iraqi forces in
Kuwait with cheap, dumb bombs, and delivered 40% of all air munitions.
During the 1999 Kosovo war, precision-guided munitions were little help against
scattered Yugoslav infantrymen fighting KLA units in the mountains, so B-52 flew
in to carpet bomb large areas.
B-747s launching 72 cruise missiles per mission can devastate enemy air defenses. Once air superiority is established, B-747s can fill the B-52 high altitude bomber role by loading 72 2000-lb bombs in their rotary launchers. The B-747 is ideal for reserve squadrons since thousands of pilots and mechanics work with 747s in their civilian occupations. During wartime, enemy intelligence will find it difficult to distinguish B-747s from civilian 747 in operation around the world. This will allow B-747s to utilize airbases in friendly countries without raising alarm among local residents. A B-747 can provide any Air Force with the most modern, flexible, and cost-effective bomber on Earth. Here is a 1996 USAF paper about this concept: Transport Bombers.
 B-747s can also dominate the world's oceans. A squadron of 12 B-747s loaded with anti-ship cruise missiles can be vectored toward a enemy fleet by satellites or submarines, while E-3 Sentry AWACS provide escort with long-range radar. The squadron can break into four flights and launch a total of 1064 cruise missiles at a naval fleet from four directions a thousand miles away. Anti-ship Harpoon missiles are already in service with B-52 squadrons, but they have a range of just 100 miles. The US military refuses to adapt its air-launched cruise missiles to an anti-ship role because the idea frightens Admirals since ships can be attacked beyond a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) defensive perimeter. However, other navies will not prove ignorant and numerous types of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles will appear, such as: RADAR SEEKING - homes-in on ship radar emissions, like the HARM missile RADAR IMAGE - seeks a ship's radar profile, like the 84D Harpoon and Exocet TORPEDO CARRIER - releases a homing torpedo near the fleet, like the Sea Lance INFRARED - seeks heat produced by ship engines, like the 84E Harpoon RADIO FREQUENCY - seeks out radio frequencies produced by communication systems LIDAR SCANNER - scans the horizon with a laser looking for a reflection ANTI-AIRCRAFT - cruises until its radar-equipped sub-missile finds a flying target, like a SUBSAM These missiles can be constructed using existing technology for less than one million dollars each. US Navy Tomahawks cost slightly less than one million each and those are more complex as they require a booster rocket to shoot it out of a canister from a ship. If four B-747 bombers fired 1064 anti-ship cruise missiles, that is a billion dollars of munitions. However, a single modern destroyer costs one billion dollars and has over 300 crewmen, and those are escorts. Aircraft carriers with aircraft cost $10 billion. Given that a CSG normally has around ten ships, that is some $20 billion of hardware in the target area. Even if 90% of the 1064 missiles are successfully destroyed or jammed, 106 will strike the fleet. If this doesn't sink all the ships, the B-747s can return the next day for another attack. Stealthy Aircraft or Cruise Missiles The US Air Force has always shunned cruise missiles in favor of deep penetrating stealth aircraft like the B-2 bomber escorted by an F-22 fighter. Expensive air-launched cruise missiles were developed during the Cold war as another nuclear weapons delivery method. Afterwards, most were converted into conventional air launch cruise missiles and were expended in recent conflicts. The US Air Force has not procured cruise missiles this past decade. An F-15E fighter can easily carry Navy Tomahawk cruise missiles. In fact, any aircraft can carry and launch cruise missiles. If strike missions can be performed by inexpensive aircraft launching stand-off cruise missiles, there is no need for ultra-expensive radar evading stealth aircraft. Millions of dollars have been spent to develop a short-range air-launched cruise missile called the SLAM-ER, but the program has run into mysterious problems, and no one has explained why larger Tomahawks are not air-launched instead. While the US Navy has procured thousands of Tomahawk missiles for use by ships and submarines, it has not pursued the obvious step of mounting some on aircraft like the F/A-18. This will allow the Navy to strike targets far inland, well beyond the range of ship-launched cruise missiles. Part of this resistance may have been a desire for a stealthy carrier-based strike aircraft, which was the idea of the canceled A-12 project a decade ago. However, a more likely reason is that aircraft that can launch cruise missiles from well outside a CSG's defensive perimeter present a threat that CSGs have no solution. The Royal Australian Air Force is not constrained by carrier Admirals, and has recently purchased German cruise missiles for use by their F/A-18s and P-3s. These are smaller missiles with a range of around 250 miles, yet this makes them so capable that some Asian nations have complained. The Australians will also buy some anti-ship variants, so the US Navy may no longer invite them to war games. The Earth is Round If several aircraft launch a large array of anti-ship cruise missiles, it will be impossible for a fleet to jam or destroy most of this mix, especially if they are led by several unjamable Super 8 anti-ship missiles. Surface fleets cannot defend against mass cruise missile attacks because the Earth is round. While no one will debate this fact, they pretend ship defensive systems can track and destroy large numbers of incoming sea-skimming missiles. The curvature of the Earth limits line-of-sight and radar detection to around 20 miles for ships. Cruise missiles fly 550 mph, or just over nine miles a minute, so a ship has just over two minutes to track and destroy an incoming cruise missile once it is detected coming over the horizon. Detection at 20 miles is very optimistic since the frontal radar and visual view of an incoming cruise missile is tiny; 10 miles is more realistic. A bigger challenge is that ship radar systems are located thirty or more feet above the ocean surface, while sea skimming missiles fly around ten feet above the surface. This means systems like Phalanx must look down and attempt to pick out a tiny cruise missile against ocean clutter produced by waves and white caps. This is why these systems are normally tested by having them shoot at a drone flying much higher off the surface, and only one drone at a time. Moreover, Phalanx fires a stream of bullets where it projects the missile will be in a few seconds, yet that tiny target is always making slight flight adjustments to compensate for air turbulence while tracking its moving ship target, so the stream of bullets is likely to miss. The new Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) is very limited for ship defense. It fires a flurry of small infrared-seeking anti-aircraft missiles at an incoming cruise missile. However, a cruise missile has a very small engine, and is a turbofan jet that puts out very little heat. In addition, the heat source is in the rear and shielded by the body of an incoming cruise missile. Finally, RAMs looking for heat sources will be confused by hot rocket exhaust from other outbound RAMs and hot bullets from the Phalanx 20mm guns. (below) To make matters worse, a rocket firing anti-ship missile may be developed to bewilder and overwhelm ship defensive systems. As this cruise missile approaches a ship, it fires a variety of supersonic HYDRA 70mm rockets in the same manner aircraft now fire Hydras from the nineteen-tube M261 lightweight pod. Most of these unjammable high-speed rockets will miss a ship, but some will impact while all overwhelm and confuse ship defensive systems.
The Chinese are capable of building a larger version with much greater range, however, 300 km (182 nm) is plenty of range to attack a CSG since these missiles can be launched from aircraft, shore batteries, or submarines. The Chinese have built the YJ-62 anti-ship missile with a range of 280 km (176 nm) and uses a frequency agile radar seeker (e.g. frequency hopping), which is very difficult to jam. They are also testing the YJ-63 air launched anti-ship missile with an electro-optical seeker so the missile can be flown into its target by operator via a televised image. No matter what shipboard defensive system is used, it will be lucky to track and shoot down a couple of incoming cruise missiles during a mass attack given their limited engagement opportunity. Decoys and jamming may confuse some missiles, however, they also confuse and blind ship-based anti-missile systems. In addition, dumb Super 8 missiles and a cruise missile unleashing two dozen Hydra rockets cannot be jammed. Although the US Navy's expensive Aegis radar system can launch and guide dozens of large anti-missile missiles at once, the radar clutter produced by incoming missiles, ship decoys, and ship defensive systems during the two minute engagement period will be immense. Large solid-rocket burning Standard missiles will likely be downed by the ship's own RAMs and Phalanx bullets, while the cooler low flying incoming cruise missiles slip past. US Navy officers do not dispute this vulnerability, but point out that aircraft from CSGs can shoot down cruise missiles. However, they face time constraints as well. While a Hawkeye airborne radar aircraft is always flying above a CSG to provide radar coverage out to 100 miles, its ability to detect small cruise missiles just above the surface is roughly one-third that. Therefore, the Hawkeye radar operator can warn the fleet that 1000 cruise missile are incoming (at nine miles a minute) and will strike in three minutes. This gives ship crews time to go to general quarters, but is not enough time for any airborne fighters to shoot down more than one cruise missile each. In reality, fighters would be foolish to fly toward an area where ships will soon unleash a massive anti-missile volley. This lack of warning is yet another fleet weakness. Sailors do not sit at their weapons stations 24 hours a day. Unless a fleet happens to be on alert (e.g. at general quarters) three minutes may not be enough time to man and arm all weapons systems. Ship captains hate to arm these weapons systems anyway because they may shoot at whatever moves, which is dangerous for a CSG with its own aircraft flying around. A CSG has sophisticated and capable ship defensive systems that should be able to protect the fleet from a volley of a dozen incoming cruise missiles. However, a hundred or more incoming missiles will be overwhelming. The fleet is likely to expend all its decoys and much of its anti-missile weaponry defending against such an attack, and it will take hours to rearm these systems. Meanwhile, another mass cruise missile attack can occur at any time. The Russians have sold supersonic Sunburn missiles to several nations, cutting the time ships have to destroy an incoming target even further. Some nations may resort to modern kamikazes, sending a supersonic jet fighter loaded with bombs and fuel zooming in just off the surface. The pilot may even eject just prior to impact that will result in a tremendous explosion fatal to the ship. The challenge of shooting down incoming cruise missiles is complex since weapon systems are mounted on a ship that is moving forward and rocking and rolling, while the tiny cruise missiles bounce around from air turbulence as they streak toward a ship. Meanwhile, friendly aircraft are flying around while terrified gunner's mates arrive at their stations to perform a task they have never really practiced as their expensive missiles are rarely fired. Finally, it takes only one cruise missile hit to sink most modern unarmored warships packed with munitions and fuel. The US Air Force is excited about the the potential of using high-power microwave weapons to "fry" the electronics of ground-based systems and incoming missiles. This has not been fully demonstrated and presents difficulties because range is limited to a few hundred meters. Such weapons seem ideal for ship defense, although they present problems with "friendly frying"; e.g. damaging electronics on the ship itself or nearby ships. However, anti-ship missile designers can counter such weapons by shielding their electronics. Since ships are large targets, frying an incoming missile's electronics may do little good a few hundred meters away as it will continue onward and likely strike its target. Nevertheless, it is an area worthy of research. Airborne Radar and Jumbo Jets The US Navy has long recognized these weaknesses, so has focused on shooting down attacking aircraft before they can unleash their missiles. Older Soviet bombers had limited range, so CSGs could anticipate the general direction from which they might attack and project anti-air operations in that direction with the help of aerial tankers. American Admirals felt they had a good chance of intercepting Soviet bombers before they could launch their missiles. Meanwhile, the fleet would be warned and could maneuver in hopes of evading distant incoming missiles. Toward the end of the Cold War, the Soviet developed longer-range bombers and long-range cruise missiles, but these were devoted to strategic nuclear attack. The Cold War ended before these systems were available for a naval bomber role. The fleet defense strategy of shooting down cruise missile launching aircraft became obsolete as long-range jumbo jets and long-range cruise missiles appeared. Modern jumbo jets have such great range that naval bombers can now fly long enveloping routes to approach a fleet from any direction almost anywhere on Earth. Given the limited number of fighters and aerial tankers, it is impossible to maintain continuous air patrols beyond a 500 miles defensive perimeter. Fighters with tanker support can fly extended missions, but when and which direction? Naval bombers can attack at any time and from any direction, and only a few carrier aircraft can be maintained airborne 24 hours a day. Land-based naval bombers can also be escorted by large airborne radar aircraft like AWACS that have twice the detection range of a fighter's small radar system. In addition, the large radar systems in modified commercial jets like AWACS scan in all directions, while a fighter can only "paint the sky" in front of it; e.g. their frontal radar system can only detect objects in a cone shaped area directly to their front. Therefore, finding enemy bombers requires intelligence of where to look, or just luck. If a land-based naval bomber flight with a airborne radar escort happens upon a carrier fighter on deep patrol, they will see him first and will have plenty of time to change course to avoid him. Keep in mind that a fighter aircraft on patrol cruises no faster than a commercial passenger jet. Aircraft carriers carry Hawkeye airborne radar aircraft with a 360 degree detection ability out to 100 miles. However, there are only 3-4 per CSG, so only one can remain airborne all the time and it remains near the carrier. This is why carrier Admirals like to mass their CSGs so more aircraft can provide perimeter defense, yet that only provides a huge mass of ship targets. New technologies may provide help with ship defense. Perhaps lasers can blind infrared-guided missiles, but only in clear weather. Microwave weapons may destroy the electronics of cruise missiles. However, even if such weapons are developed and deployed, they still face the problem of engaging dozens of cruise missiles arriving at once. A difficult question is which modern American commercial jet is best for modification into a naval bomber. A basic comparison of the leading candidates is provided by the chart (below) with information from Boeing. In general, the 747 with four engines has twice the payload as the two-engine 737 and 787. On the other hand, It burns twice as much fuel per mile and is limited to 10,000 foot runways, instead of 8000 foot for the two smaller jets. The 747 has twice the range of the 737, but the newly designed 787- 8 will have even greater range because its newer design and lightweight composite airframe provides 20% greater fuel efficiency. Of course the 737 and 787 have a smaller radar profile and are harder to see and hit with weaponry. On the other hand, a 747 can carry 72 cruise missiles, while they can only carry around 35. In addition, each aircraft requires the same aircrew, so a 747 is more efficient, although it maintenance costs are much higher with four engines.
The 747 costs twice as much, however, airlines have downsized and retired 747- 400s after just a few years of service, so Boeing is converting them to freighters and selling them cheap. Keep in mind the prices quoted above are Boeing's "sticker" price for a single aircraft. Discounts are the norm for large orders, but aircraft costs may double to "militarize" these airframes. Keep in mind that each B-2 bomber ended up costing $2 billion each, or $2000 million. The US Navy is now buying F/A-18E/F fighter-attack aircraft for around $80 million each (the production cost only) and the new F-35 is expected to cost much more than that. Therefore, a bomber based on a modern passenger jet design may cost less than today's custom-built fighters. While the 787 is the most efficient with greater range, it will not enter service until 2008 with a backlog of some 200 civilian orders. Therefore, any military order cannot be filled until several years later. The 747 is the most capable option, but much more costly. On the other hand, the 737 cannot fly across the Pacific, although it can fly from California to Hawaii fully loaded. However, Boeing recently developed a 737 airborne radar variant for Australia that can air refuel, so that is an option to extend range. The new 737-700ER has nine auxiliary fuel tanks that can be removed if more cargo space is desired. The Best Naval Bomber The 737 may not be the best aircraft for naval
strike missions because of its limited range, but is the best option at this time
simply because it is a much less expensive choice. The
737 was selected in 2004 as the platform for the Maritime Multi-mission Aircraft
(MMA), designated the
P-8 (below). The P-8 is in development and the US Navy plans to procure 108
starting in 2010 to replace its old propeller-driven P-3s. This will be a
sophisticated aircraft capable
of maritime surveillance and attack, although its primary role is
anti-submarine warfare so it will have limited
space for munitions. In addition, the Navy has begun buying 737s modified
to carry passengers and cargo (designated the C-40) to replace their aging C-9 general support aircraft. Admirals should recognize that P-8s are very vulnerable to air attack since they operate alone. They can be located by powerful shore-based radar systems and enemy fighters can easily gun them down. Recall the the 2001 incident where the Chinese took offense at a US Navy EP-3 snooping offshore, and dispatched fighters to force it down. As a result, P-8s cannot safely patrol within 500 miles of an enemy coastline, perhaps 1000 miles if the enemy has aerial tankers. Moreover, patrolling an enemy's coastline to provide advance warning of enemy threats is something CSGs desperately need. Therefore, Admirals should recognize the value of procuring some E-737 airborne radar aircraft to escort P-8s near enemy shores. These are currently in production by Boeing for Australia and Turkey. E-737s are needed as escorts for fleet screening operations, a mission performed in World War II by small "disposable" destroyers. It should become standard practice in fleet operations that a pair of E-737 and P-8 aircraft conduct continual patrols between the "enemy" coastline and a CSG to provide advance warning. In addition, CSGs will discover that E-737s operating from nearby land bases can provide superior air control support for carrier strike aircraft than the small propeller-driven E-2C Hawkeye. The larger jet-powered E-737 has greater cruise speed to fly with jet attack aircraft, far more range than the Hawkeye (which cannot aerial refuel either), and more powerful radar. There is no funding planned for E-737s, but they can adjust the planned buy of 108 P-8s downward to afford 108 737 naval aircraft, something like 28 E-737s and 80 P-8s. Once the idea of Navy E-737s is accepted, the idea of a B-737 naval bomber can arise. The P-8 already includes a small weapons bay. It will cost little for the Navy to order a dozen or so 737s to serve as bombers with nothing more than a large missile bay to carry around 35 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Development should cost little since the basic C-40 cargo version is in production and only rotary launchers and launch doors are needed. Rotary launchers are easily removable so a B-737 can also carry cargo to support other missions. B-737s will always be escorted and commanded by a sophisticated E-737 or P-8, so they needn't complex and expensive communications and command stations. An all-737 fleet can greatly reduce pilot and maintainer training costs, and simplifies logistics. For example, the same CFM56-7 engines are used by the C-40, E-737, and P-8. Boeing has also designed a 737 SIGINT variant that the US Navy is considering to replace its EP-3s. Funding for B-737s may be problematic as carrier Admirals may view them as a threat to their cherished CSGs. Eliminating excess CSGs to pay for more land-based naval aircraft will be difficult. The Bush administration attempted to decommission one CSG in 2005 because there were not enough aircraft for 12 CSGs, but the move was blocked by Congress. However, carrier Admirals are aviators, so hopefully they will accept that eliminating one or two CSGs will allow the formation of a dozen naval squadrons of 737 type aircraft. Likewise, any nation wishing to become an instant naval power need only a squadron of these three 737 variants. Development costs for the E-737 and P-8 have already been paid, so the cost of add-on foreign orders are small. If the US Navy fails to develop a B-737 bomber, it should not cost much to develop one as they are just modified C-40s. A squadron of militarized 737s will also have an impressive strategic strike capability since they can also launch land attack cruise missiles or drop dumb bombs at targets ashore. A 737 squadron will prove superior to an entire CSG in the sea control and strategic strike roles, at only 5% of the cost. Manning and maintenance crews for this squadron will total less than the crew of a single destroyer. Maintenance costs will be low since 737s are very common which need not "deploy" during peacetime since they can cruise 20 times faster than a surface fleet to quickly go into action anywhere on Earth, and cannot be sunk by submarines or mines. However, there are many roles that only a CSG can fill, so fleets of surface warships are needed to support amphibious and expeditionary operations. However, E-737s, P-8s, and B-737s can rule the oceans and strike inland targets with far less risk than a CSG at a tiny fraction of their cost. Naval Bomber Tactics The example of four 747 bombers launching over 1000 cruise missiles at a fleet is certainly feasible, but such billion-dollar missions are overkill. If the bombers are given bad intel about the fleet location and direction, all missiles could miss. Since missiles will be launched from 500 to 1000 miles from the fleet, it will take over an hour for the cruise missiles to reach their target area. If the fleet disperses or changes course shortly after these missiles are launched, all missiles may miss. This is unlikely because fleets cruise at around 25 knots to conserve fuel and because the gas turbines on cruisers and destroyers break down if they are run near top speed for over an hour. A naval bomber mission involving eight 737s is practical and effective. They will operate in two flights of four aircraft that attack from two directions, right angle from one another. This ensures one volley of missiles will have a broadside target; it is difficult for a missile to hit a ship head-on or in the stern (rear). Therefore, the anti-missile tactic of turning the fleet toward an incoming volley of cruise missiles will not work if another volley is incoming at a right angle. Each flight will consist of an E-737 airborne radar aircraft (below), a P-8, and two B-737 bombers. Tanker support may be required. The P-8s small weapons bay may be loaded with several anti-aircraft cruise missiles, similar to SUBSAMs, while smaller Harpoon anti-ship missiles may be carried under wing for individual targets of opportunity. Each B-737 will have 35 anti-ship cruise missiles of various types.
If the E-737 airborne radar detects a threat, immediate evasive action will ensure the aircraft in the bomber flight are safe. A decision must then be made to abort the attack, which may not be possible due to fuel constraints. Keep in mind that a fighter on patrol cruises no faster than a 737, so if they are detected, the bombers just need to change course to keep their distance. As the bombers approach the 1000 mile to target mark, they need a final update from naval intel. If no update is possible, the attack may be aborted, depending on the size of the target, the fleet inventory of anti-ship cruise missiles, and the likelihood that the target fleet may have changed course since the last report. Although the B-737s can unleash their missiles at the 1000 mile point, the attack could fail should the target ships change course shortly thereafter. Since enemy aircraft are unlikely to be found more than 500 miles from a CSG, the flight may wait until it is closer to the target and request one more target update before launch. During this mission, the lower flying P-8 uses its infrared and optical sensors, its maritime radar, and signal intelligence capability to watch for surface threats so the flight can divert if necessary. It would be nice if the naval bomber flight could acquire its own target information prior to launch. The P-8's signal intelligence sensors may be able to track a fleet 1000 miles away using triangulation with the P-8 in the other flight by tracking the fleet's communications or radar emissions. It could also fly ahead and launch a probe, e.g. a high-speed disposable UAV to overfly the target fleet. Cruise missiles also have a video transmission capability and can be used as an intel probe. However, probes are undesirable as it will warn the fleet of an impending attack. More fighters will be launched and sent on deep tanker-supported patrols, while sailors man battle stations and the fleet makes a sharp turn. There are better intelligence options to determine fleet direction and speed: submarines, fishing boats, coast watchers, satellites, spies, signal intercepts, or fast high-flying aircraft. In some cases, a fleet is in a stationary defensive posture to protect a landing, as was the case in the battle of Okinawa, so targeting is not an issue. If a decision is made to attack, both flights will begin a lengthy launch sequence. The two four-aircraft flights will be several hundred miles apart and launching/firing from different angles. Keep in mind that cruise missiles fly only 550mph, so they will not shoot off ahead of their bomber flying at the same speed. This allows each bomber to "crab" to one side to lay out a neat row of 35 cruise missiles flying abreast. A few of these will be Super 8s, designed to fly a little faster so they arrive before the sensor-guided missiles. Super 8s and perhaps rocket firing cruise missiles will arrive sooner to overwhelm, confuse, and exhaust fleet defenses. One question is the missile spread. Should
missiles be launched toward a narrow target area, or a broader target area to
ensure some will hit if their targeting information is not perfect?
Should missiles be launched so they all arrive simultaneously? This
ensures fleet defenses are easily overwhelmed, but allows ships maximum use of sensor
decoys. If missiles arrive in four waves one minute apart, ship decoys
will have been expended on the first and second waves, leaving them open for
easy targeting. Whatever tactics are used, it seems certain that of the 140 missiles
launched from four B-737s, dozens will strike ships. Such battles seem
unfair
as the naval bombers face almost no risk and can return the next day for another
attack. Since warships are packed with fuel and explosives, the 1000 lb
warhead of a single cruise missile can sink a ship. During the 1983 Falklands war, the HMS Sheffield
(below), was hit by a single air-launched Exocet anti-ship missile.
The damage was not fatal since the missile failed to explode, but the ship ignited and
burned until it sank. The P-8s may carry a few anti-aircraft cruise missiles to launch along with the B-737s broadside. Enemy aircraft will be so overwhelmed by the 140 incoming anti-ship cruise missiles, they will not notice the few seeking to destroy them. In addition, an enemy fighter pilot seeing dozens of cruise missiles flying in from one direction will know that enemy bombers launched them. He may heroically embark on a supersonic one-way suicide mission to shoot them down without fuel to return. Incoming anti-aircraft missiles may shoot him down, or at least disrupt his pursuit. 737-type aircraft from this bomber flight may be shot down. However, these naval bombers launched those missiles over 500 miles from the fleet and turned for home at top speed long ago, so they are likely beyond range. 737s can fly a couple hundred miles an hour faster than their cruise speed, especially in a shallow dive. A fighter can catch them IF he is patrolling at maximum range of 500 miles from the fleet and IF he happens to be near the path of the cruise missiles and IF he happens to see them near the surface then he may be able to chase and shoot down some bombers, IF he was lucky enough to guess their route back home. Even if all these things happen, the E-737's more powerful radar will see him first and the flight can change course to avoid the fighter's forward-looking radar cone. Finally, the E-737s may have rear-facing anti-aircraft missiles to fire at him, while the P-8 is equipped with towed missile decoys and other countermeasures. Meanwhile, another group of naval bombers may arrive an hour later for a follow-on attack, catching the severely damaged fleet off guard as they attempt to rearm defensive systems and save damaged ships. It is probably a good idea to add wing-mounted AMRAAM long-range anti-aircraft missiles to E-737s. While a big jet should avoid fighters, it may detect a fighter approaching at high-speed that is lucky or has been tipped off by intelligence sources that enemy bombers are in that area. Before a fleeing E-737s turns to dive, it may let an AMRAAM fly that may kill the fighter. It may also have rear-mounted AMRAAMs to fire at pursing fighters. However, perhaps E-737s can easily kill fighters on patrol just like snipers. Given their superior radar, they may close on a patrolling fighter from its side and launch an AMRAAM from 100 miles away and flee. If the fighter continues its straight path with his frontal radar scanning forward, it may be hit by that missile with little warning. Naval bomber flights may also be accompanied by strike fighters from aircraft carriers or land bases supported by aerial tankers. They can be used to gun down enemy fighters on patrol with guidance from the E-737s, or sink lone enemy ships located by the P-8. They may also join in a strike on a fleet, flying behind the cruise missile barrage to take advantage of the chaos while launching smaller anti-ship missiles from 100 miles out. Fleet Defensive Tactics Fleets may attempt to avoid long-range cruise missile attacks by changing course at least once an hour, similar to the zigzag tactic used during World II to evade submarines. However, this burns twice as much fuel and slows the fleet's overall advance. In addition, a fleet cruising at around 25 knots will travel only 30 miles by the time cruise missiles launched an hour away arrive. With some 140 cruise missiles arriving from two directions in rows a mile wide, they will cover a wide swath across the ocean. Fleet course changes will need to be long and sharp zigzags to evade this threat, and these random turns must be luckily made just after the missiles are launched. Another option is to position destroyers some 500 miles from the fleet to form a huge defensive perimeter and provide adequate warning for a course change should it detect enemy bombers or cruise missiles, just before it is destroyed. However, escorts also protect fleets from submarines, so the carrier becomes an easier target for submarines, while a destroyer operating by its lonesome is also a much easier target for submarines. In addition, CSGs have few escorts nowadays, so there are not enough for a massive defensive perimeter. If a bomber flight happens upon a lone destroyer, the P-8 should see it in time to divert the flight. If a fleet uses such tactics, the mission may be scrubbed while the P-8 unleashes its wing-mounted Harpoons at the destroyer. Otherwise, the bomber force may circle around and launch two dozen anti-ship missiles at the destroyer from two angles at a safe stand-off distance over 100 miles away and then return home. A fleet really doesn't stand a chance against a mass cruise missiles attack. The example used here is a rather small attack by four smaller (737-size) naval bombers launching a mix of 140 missiles. Assuming a fleet can shoot down and confuse 90% of these incoming missiles, 15 will strike the fleet with devastating results. In addition, the naval bombers will return home unscathed and can return the next day for another attack to finish off a fleet in disarray. This is why surface fleets should disperse and hide until naval bombers are destroyed by other systems, as discussed in Chapter 6. Big Jet Aircraft Can Rule the Oceans Keep in mind that B-737 rotary bomb racks can carry 2000 lb bombs instead of cruise missiles. In many low-intensity and even medium intensity conflicts, marines ashore will encounter large numbers of enemy infantrymen. With the Navy's admitted shortfall in naval gunfire, marines ashore will rely on busy carrier aircraft for support. While an F/A-18E/F can deliver are seven 1000 lb bombs, a B-737 can deliver thirty-five 2000-lb bombs. If bombs are needed far inland as was the case in Afghanistan, the F/A-18E/F can only deliver four 1000 lb bombs after several aerial refuelings. In such cases, carrier Admirals will agree that sending two B-737s to pummel enemy infantry with 70 2000 lb bombs is a better idea than sending 36 F/A-18E/Fs. Basic bombing is not the primary mission for B-737s, but it is a capability. In addition, the rotary bomb racks can be removed so it can serve as a cargo transport. This is the future of naval warfare. Large land-based militarized passenger jets will rule the oceans. Perhaps these large naval aircraft with a crew of a dozen should be recognized like ships; christening a B-737, the USS Texas for example. Aircraft aboard aircraft carriers cannot protect the fleet from these "airships" as they haven't the range or the long-range airborne radar protection. Moreover, airborne fleets flying at 600 knots are far more capable than a surface fleet chugging along at 25 knots while vulnerable to submarines and sea mines. Navies have the financial resources for naval bombers, but must redirect them from surface fleets. A single modern destroyer costs a much to man and operate as a dozen of militarized 737s. Admirals must accept that fleets of large commercial jets can safely clear the oceans of fleets of surface ships at a far lower cost and risk. ©2006 www.G2mil.com |
India and China
recently purchased advanced Novator anti-ship cruise missiles from Russia.
The 3M-45 (SS-N-27 Sizzler) is notable for being subsonic in the cruise phase,
while utilizing a supersonic dart for the final 20 km (12.4 miles) of the
attack. Other versions have a dual radar/infrared seeker to overcome
countermeasures and weather problems. These missiles have a maximum range
of 300 km so they are compliant with the Missile Technology Control Regime, to
which Russia is a signatory. 
This force will need solid intel about
an enemy fleet
location and heading.
The E-737 and P-8 will lead the way 100 miles ahead of the two B-737s
in each flight. This lessens the radar profile and allows the B-737s more
time to avoid trouble. The E-737s greater radar range allows the flight to avoid any surprises from enemy aircraft, which
could be large land-based aircraft or carrier fighters who have
tanked up for an extended patrol. This would be odd, but they may have
made a lucky guess that an attack was incoming, or tipped off by their naval
intelligence. Most aerial contacts may be neutral commercial aircraft that the bomber flight will want to avoid lest an enemy agent send out an
alert. 