Helicopter reconnaissance is a dangerous mission. Jet aircraft use high speed or high altitude to avoid ground fire, helicopters use luck. Reconnaissance helicopters often "find" targets by drawing fire, which is why they must be cheap. The US Army's multi-billion dollar RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program seeks to make a helicopter invisible, which it impossible. Stealth technology can reduce its radar image, but only for the front of the aircraft. Since reconnaissance involves looking for the enemy, it's impossible keep a helicopter pointed toward him.
The Comanche has nearly the same side and bottom radar profile as the proven Cobra and Kiowa helicopters. It is also just as easy to see visually, which is the crude method most low-level AAA systems rely upon. Traditional eyeball aiming is how all the Apaches were shot down or damaged in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Comanche will be quieter, but not quiet, and produce less heat, yet still enough for infra-red detection. When Congressmen questioned the need for multi-million dollar helicopters for reconnaissance, the Army added a gun and missiles and argued that the Comanche is a gunship too. However, the Apache is a more effective gunship, it has much more armament and more armor too. This is why former Defense Secretary William Perry cancelled the Comanche back in 1996, but the program hung on as a test platform and quietly slipped back into procurement plans.
It's ludicrous to think that a helicopter is going to sneak up on a camouflaged enemy. If
an enemy is not
moving and covers his infra-red signature, a Comanche will have to come
within 100 meters to find him. A smart enemy will wait until he's that
close before letting loose a volley, which is what happened to dozens of Apaches
in Afghanistan and Iraq. A serious enemy will dispose of
a $60 million-dollar
gold-plated Comanche as easily as older Kiowa and Cobra helicopters.
Actually, Comanches will prove more vulnerable since they plan to carry
Hellfire missiles inside their fuselage to limit radar signature. Bullets
have exploded Hellfires mounted on the Apaches stub wings causing damage, but an
internal explosion will doom a Comanche. The
US Army doesn't have billions of dollars to waste on this target drone, it
should just upgrade the Kiowa and Cobras, or modify some Apaches into RAH-64s. 
Army tacticians are struggling with the employment of light armored vehicles in the offense. No one has suggested they should have "stealth technology" so the enemy can't see them because the idea is absurd. However, the Comanche will have even less armor protection as it floats into enemy territory, yet the Army accepts the idea that the Comanche will have an "Indian ghost shirt" to protect it from harm. The Comanche is not needed to maintain a helicopter industrial base because the Army needs to upgrade all its UH-60As and CH-47Ds, or buy the new version of the CH-53E heavy lift helicopter (dubbed the CH-53X at right, which can easily lift 28,000 lbs) This proven helicopter is already used by the US Marine Corps to rapidly move equipment and supplies around the battlefield.
America's leading defense expert, George C. Wilson, listed the Comanche as the Pentagon's #1 Turkey in a November 15, 2003 commentary in the National Journal. He noted:
The Pentagon's Selected
Acquisition Reports for June 30, 2002, and for June 30, 2003, the latest one
available, show that the Comanche's cost jumped from $39 million apiece to $59
million in only one year -- a 51 percent increase that includes research costs.
Part of the reason for the giant jump is the Army's decision to buy fewer
aircraft in hopes of holding down the total cost of the Comanche program. But
cutting quantity cancels out the savings that would come from large-scale
production at the factory.
Instead of buying 1,213 Comanches for $48 billion, the plan now is to buy 650
for $38 billion. The "savings" would free up $10 billion for other
cash-strapped, high-priority programs such as the Army's light and fast, but
expensive, Stryker brigades. Gen. Peter Schoomaker, the Army's new top soldier
who is reviewing his service's budget, is said to be wincing at Comanche's
soaring costs. So the order could be cut again during the Pentagon's fiscal 2005
budget scrub now under way. And such cuts would make the cost for one Comanche
go up even more. But the larger question confronting Schoomaker, Rumsfeld, and
others in the defense establishment, including members of Congress, is whether
the guerrilla war in Iraq is demonstrating that no helicopter, regardless of how
fancy, can survive on today's battlefields.
With a weapon not much more sophisticated than a hand grenade shot out of a
peashooter, guerrillas in Iraq have damaged and downed the Army's most advanced
attack helicopter, the Longbow Apache, as well as simpler troop transports such
as the Chinooks and Blackhawks. This vulnerability could have been predicted by
anyone who bothered to study the fate of U.S. helicopters in the Vietnam War.
Back then, Vietcong and North Vietnamese soldiers not only downed helicopters
with the rocket-propelled grenades now threatening helicopters in Iraq. The
Vietnamese also learned how to shoot the copters down by simply lying on their
backs and grouping their rifle bullets in the path of the slow fliers they could
hear coming. If such simple ground fire is so lethal, how can the $59 million
Comanche or any other helicopter survive the deadlier shoulder-fired
anti-aircraft missiles now being sold all around the world?
For years, weapons experts inside the Pentagon have posed that question, but to
no avail. The Army's helicopter fraternity and its defense-industry allies, who
give millions of dollars to the political campaigns of senators and
representatives, have managed to beat back such challenges during the Comanche's
long and difficult birth. But the pictures of crashed helicopters in Iraq and
their dead and wounded passengers have made the vulnerability question too big
for defense leaders to ignore. Already, critics are making this argument
behind closed doors in the Pentagon: If the Army must have more reconnaissance
helicopters that can shoot, why not buy more of the $12.5 million Longbow
Apaches (left) already flying and scrap the Comanche?
The Army has plenty of firepower, but is lacks the ability to rapidly supply forward combat forces and move them rapidly in-theater. The first step toward a 21st Century Army is the formation of helicopter transport brigades with 54 new CH-53X heavy lift helicopters each. These helicopters could quickly fly combat vehicles planned for the new "medium weight" brigades over mountains and rivers, and support their rapid deployment in theater, like from Germany to Albania. They could also support air landed units by hauling supplies from ships off-shore, and speed supplies to armored units that outrun their supplies lines, as happened during the invasion of Iraq. Buying 400 CH-53E helicopters would require billions of dollars, but the money is available; in the Comanche budget, which now devours a billion dollars a year and produces nothing.
Carlton Meyer editorG2mil@Gmail.com
Letters
Dump the Comanche
Thank you so much for a well written article on the Comanche and its
increasingly dubious utility recently. I'm from Australia and I've been following the progress (or lack of it) of
this machine in earnest since I first saw the black mockup in mid 1990. I must admit I was
initially impressed but after it was selected in 1991 as
the new LH copter and the redesigns, delays and costs 'spiraled' the doubts
started to set in .
Perhaps if the Army and Boeing/Sikorsky had kept to the original schedule
and the planned IOC in the mid/late 90's it may have been alright, but I
agree with the tenor of your article and consider the time has come to pull
the plug before too much money and time is wasted on this project. Plainly speaking, my main concern with the Comanche now is that events,
threats and technology have overtaken it and yesterdays machine and idea is
irrelevant for today and the future.
From an Aussie perspective, we originally had the Comanche on the list to
replace our Army Kiowa scout copters, but fortunately we opted out when the
delays etc. set in and finally selected the Eurocopter 'Aussie Tiger' where
the first ones will IOC next year here.
Better late than never but I shudder to think how much more we'd have to
wait and pay if the 1991 idea of the 'Aussie Comanche' had gone ahead.
I was particularly impressed by the argument of modern conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq where American and Australian's have fought in knocking
over the Taliban and Saddam's lot in which many copters have been downed by
gunfire to RPG's. (we've not lost any copters yet). I never considered an explosion in the Comanche's internal weapon bays from
an external hit detonating a Hellfire. Thank you for that elucidation, a
most persuasive argument indeed.
Finally, as a friend and well-wisher its quite dismaying to see the U.S
whittling away time and funds on a stack of near useless defence projects
over the years. Of the current 'generation' I've been watching for over 15 years now as
they've crystallised and its disheartening to see the F/A-22, Comanche, V-22
and a few others eat up huge funds but simultaneously become increasingly
irrelevant. I fear our American mates are becoming more vulnerable and developing
shortcomings rather than addressing real defence needs.
I have many friends in the U.S through mountaineering (we try to
solve the
mystery of the British climbers Mallory and Irvine on Everest in 1924) and I
naturally as a mate I'm concerned for their welfare, we often discuss
defence issues as well and I can assure you , they're just as concerned at
the direction the pentagon is going with its purchases as me here in Australia.
Will Sloan
A Joint Helicopter in Essential
The Secretary of Defense is in the process of transforming the US armed
forces, as the overall mission of the US armed forces has change from facing
a large similarly-armed force from a large industrialized county to facing
aggressions from a smaller second- or third-world country, and from
non-affiliated aggressors. There is also the current round of Base
Realignment and Closure to consider, and some of its criteria for joint sitting of services at a single base.
Presently, US armed forces are now operating in a jointly more and more. While each service has unique institutional capabilities, there seems no
reason those cannot be carried out with equipment of identical manufacture.
The "balkanization" of the services no longer makes sense when the
interests
of the United States require protection quickly.
Not only are the US armed forces operating jointly among themselves, the US
armed forces are more and more being placed in coalition with other
country's armed forces. Since many countries purchase helicopters from US
manufacturers, logic would seem to dictate that it would be more efficacious
to have maintenance and repair for US armed forces' helicopters available
from other countries, and visa-versa, when such coalition operations are
undertaken.
As well, planning and controlling coalition operations would have more
flexibility as an entire helicopter unit may not need to be dispatched to an
area of operation if say, there were a helicopter maintenance unit from
another coalition country in the area of operation. In fact, it might be
that only the pilots and crews need be dispatched as the aircraft they would
be flying in that area could be identical to those they fly when they are
with their unit. This would definitely provide for very rapid deployment
capability for both regular forces and special operations forces.
And last, but not least: Spare parts. While I could offer another
dispassionate analysis of the rationality of a joint services helicopter
acquisition program, I offer the following. My first active-duty assignment, even though I was school-trained as an
intelligence officer, was as the motor officer of a military intelligence
battalion. Other that recalcitrant generators, rapidly evaporating
gasoline, log books with legs, and mechanics missing important tools (like a
brain), the bane of my existence was spare parts.
No matter how the optimum level of parts was calculated, included the SWAG
method, there were never enough of what was needed and an astonishing amount
of what was not needed. Add to that constant inspections from an
astonishingly variety of outside organizations, who's regulations certainly
seemed to never have heard of the concepts of consistency and uniformity,
coupled with the sudden transfer of the NCO and enlisted men who tried to
run the spare parts supply, it is a wonder that any of the battalion's
generators or vehicles operated, or that I was not institutionalized. (I
did though learn those most essential of military arts: trading and
scrounging.)
In the broadest sense, with the politics of the world rapidly changing, and
in some cases mutating, US armed forces have to be at the ready to respond
with like speed. Removing conflicting, confusing, and chaotic acquisition,
and planning and equipping of the US armed forces will enhance its
capabilities, as well as saving money for the American taxpayers in the
process.
Warren R. Wooley
MD500s are ideal for Recon
You forgot to mention the MD500 Littlebird. We absolutely do not need any more OH58Ds, they're so slow and underpowered its pathetic. MD500's are well proven by SOCOM, can be outfitted with all the sensors/weapons of the OH58D and still be able to keep up with Blackhawks on Air Assaults (which the OH58 can not). MD500s have a very low maint/flight hour ratio and are more robust because of no hydraulics. They are also a very small target to try and shoot down. That the Army chose the OH58 over the OH6 (as the MD500s earlier version was called) in spite of everything pilots and program managers said says a lot about the acquisition program.
I don't know what an MH53X costs, but at $59 million for each Comanche, you probably have enough to buy an MH53X and still have enough left over to buy a couple of MD500s.
Reid
High Tech vs Real Tech
I am amazed that the military continues to dismantle really effective weapon systems in favor of brilliantly incompetent replacements. The Comanche has no hope of surviving in the battlefield however, many hotshot pilots who relish the privilege of flying the most advanced helicopter on the planet will defend its deployment. This is preaching to the choir since you already share this point of view but what really bothers me is the idea of replacing the A-10 with say, a F-16. The ongoing trend of trading what works for what looks cool is silly.
I will admit that I am fascinated with things like the Comanche, the V-22, and the Raptor. However, I also recognize that "Rolls Royce" technology doesn't always translate into success on the theater of war. The A-10, and to a lesser extent the Apache, represent logical and cost effective combat weapon systems (when employed properly) that favored robust construction and utility over flash.
This reminds me of how the Air Force ordered the destruction of the Saturn V, it's F1 engines, and it's plans in order to ensure the survival of it's (not NASA's) Space Shuttle. The Saturn V was the most reliable and most powerful rocket/launch vehicle ever made. It suffered no launch failures which no Launch vehicle can claim today. Not even Russia's Energia, the most powerful LV in operation today, can match it. The expense of launching a Saturn V is comparable to the Space Shuttle despite what NASA might say about reusability. The Space Shuttle certainly is more glamorous, but it spends most of its power lifting itself!
I am impressed that you featured many lengthy letters that either
disagreed with you on some fronts, or in the case of one, rambled on about some
psuedo-patriotic nonsense. That's a great way to maintain some objectivity on
your site.
Damon Moran
A Better Jointhawk
Very good editorial on the
JointHawk. Might be worthwhile to see about contacting Chuck Jarnot at Piasecki on making the Jointhawk
better by the Variable Torque Ducted Propeller configuration and stub lift
wings. If you're going to buy 1200, it makes sense to make them better from the
start. Wings might be removable for specific missions if they aren't far enough
back for clearance.
I'd suggest building in permanent floats on the underside of the fuselage to
allow water landings and also to use a crumple zones in the case of a crash. The
floats would not interfere with the landing gear to allow the wheels to work in
normal activity. Might even use them as fuel pods for a few extra pounds of fuel
for additional range.
Larry
Ed: The 1-12-04 issue of "Aviation Week" noted that fighting in Iraq has cost the US Army seven Apaches, three Black Hawks, seven Chinooks, and six Kiowas. The Army lost another Black Hawk, Kiowa, and Apache since that article went to press. In addition, the Army may scrap heavily damaged helicopters: four Apaches, nine Black Hawks and four Chinooks. Also this year outside of Iraq, the Army lost twelve Apaches and three Kiowas, and may scrap another four heavily damaged Apaches and three Black Hawks. The only replacements ordered with wartime supplemental funding are seven new Chinooks, to replace this total of 41 lost helicopters and another 24 likely to be scrapped. No new Kiowas can be purchased, while the dozen CH-60L Blackhawks and several "Longbow" Apaches in the FY2004 budget are not new buys, but upgrades/overhauls of older models.
That same issue had an article about Army aviation plans which noted a shortage of Black Hawks. It revealed that the new expensive high-tech RAH-66 Comanche: "will be unable to communicate with other services or command-and-control aircraft since it will lack LINK-16, will have no active protection against anti-aircraft missiles and no blast wall between the two crewmen, meaning any hit in the cockpit, unlike the Apache, will likely disable or kill both. 'Will the Army risk a $47 million helicopter in a mission over Baghdad?' asked an Army program official. 'It's not likely, yet the Comanche is eating up 39% of the Army aviation budget. All the other small aviation programs have been killed.'" Keep in mind that the billions of dollars in funding the Army has devoted to the Comanche program this past decade has been for "development", not for procurement, and testing will continue for several more years at a cost of over one billion dollars annually.